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Chapter 1 has been allocated a maximum of 34 (with a mean of 27) pages in the SRREN. The actual chapter length (excluding references & cover page) is 43 pages: a total of 9 pages over the maximum (16 over the mean, respectively).

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Pending final approval by the IPCC Plenary section 1.6 on methodology (foreseen by the original outline) has been moved to the back of the whole report as Appendix II.

All monetary values provided in this document are adjusted for inflation/deflation and converted to USD for the base year 2005 or will be if not yet done so.

Errors in formatting, spelling etc. will be corrected in the publication phase of the report

Chapter 1: Overview of climate change and renewable energy

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1 **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

2 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report showed that climate change due to human activity (emissions
3 of greenhouse gases especially carbon dioxide from the use of fossil fuels) is accelerating and that
4 global warming in this century may be significantly greater and the consequences more severe than
5 previously realized. Many governments now advocate that to avoid the most dangerous climate
6 change it will be necessary to hold temperature rises to less than about 2°C above pre-industrial
7 values. The Assessment Report indicates that to achieve this goal will require global greenhouse
8 gas emissions to be 50% to 80% lower in 2050 than in 2000, and to begin declining by 2015.
9 Renewable energy (RE) in combination with major changes in the end use of energy, including
10 increasing efficiency and changing consumption patterns, is one of the solutions that enable
11 reducing CO₂ output while maintaining energy services and economic growth. This Special Report
12 on Renewable Energy (SRREN) explores the potential for renewable energy sources to meet goals
13 for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. It includes assessments of resources, technologies,
14 integration requirements, future energy scenarios, costs and benefits, barriers and policy options.

15 The theoretical potential for renewable energy exceeds current and projected global energy demand
16 by far, but the challenge is to capture and utilize it to provide the desired energy services in a cost
17 effective manner. Various forms of RE are universally available, and can readily be introduced in
18 both developed and developing countries. The technical potential exceeds the estimated ‘business
19 as usual’ demand by a factor of 50 by 2050. Hence, there is no shortage of renewable energy supply
20 to meet the demand, even when the only gains in end-use efficiency are endogenous ones rather
21 than being policy driven. Substantial efficiency gains in the amount of heat, electricity and
22 mechanical energy required to provide energy services benefit all forms of energy, but are
23 especially important in matching the sometimes low and distributed energy density of renewable
24 energy to end use energy services.

25 In 2008 the investment in new installations of RE systems by the electric power sector globally and
26 in both the EU and the USA exceeded their investment in new coal and gas energy systems. RE is
27 growing rapidly and in 2007 contributed about 18% of global energy use. Traditional use of
28 biomass (firewood, dung and agricultural waste), much of which is both inefficient and ecologically
29 unsustainable, accounts for 10% of global energy end-use and hydroelectricity (the most established
30 RE technology) for 2.3%. (Note: these figures depend on the accounting conventions used for
31 energy statistics, in ways discussed in this report.) Use of wind power and solar energy (PV) for
32 electricity are both increasing rapidly from a low base.

33 The scenarios analyzed in this report indicates that with a combination of high market development
34 for RE and a successfully implemented strategy for delivering energy services with higher
35 efficiency, CO₂ could eventually be stabilized at 450 ppm by 2100. To be on this trajectory, RE
36 would need to approximately double its current (2007) amount of primary energy, increasing from
37 64 EJ to about 133 EJ by 2030, and total primary energy would need to rise only slightly from 441
38 EJ in 2007 to 472 EJ (Chapter 10). The analysis also points to large uncertainties in such
39 projections, including growth projections, development and deployment of higher efficiency
40 technologies, the ability of RE technologies to overcome initial cost barriers, preferences,
41 environmental considerations and other barriers. In this context it is important to consider the multi-
42 step process whereby primary energy is converted into an energy carrier (heat, electricity or
43 mechanical work), and then into an energy service. Doing so can help to identify the most cost
44 effective, most energy efficient or least environmentally damaging strategy for meeting a particular
45 energy service such as cooking, transportation, building heating, cooling or lighting or an industrial
46 process.

1 To achieve the very large potential energy supply from RE requires a shift in development strategy
2 in both developed and developing countries by systematically implementing policies on a wide
3 scale that can overcome the economic, technical, institutional, and social barriers, which have
4 limited the adoption of RE to date. Many of these policies are known and have already been
5 attempted, but only on a limited economic or geographical scale.

6 Apart from climate change mitigation, renewable energy can play a significant role in meeting
7 sustainable development goals in both developed and developing countries, not least by enhancing
8 energy security and creating employment. In particular, use of modern energy services from
9 renewable energy in developing countries can contribute to meeting Millennium Development
10 Goals, e.g. by reducing smoke-related diseases especially for women and children, improving
11 agriculture productivity, and developing micro-industries.


1 **1.1 Background**

2 1.1.1 Climate Change

3 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) expressed very high confidence (>90%) that the release
4 of heat trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs) from human activities since 1750 has resulted in global
5 warming. The global average temperature has been measured to increase by 0.76°C (± 0.2°C)
6 between 1850-1899 and 2001-2005, and the warming trend has increased significantly over the last
7 50 years ((IPCC, 2007)). Although other GHGs contribute to this warming, CO₂ from fossil fuels
8 accounts for some 60% of the radiative forcing from GHGs. By 2010 concentrations had increased
9 from preindustrial levels of 280 ppm to 390 ppm and continue to increase ((NOAA, 2010)).
10 Moreover, even if GHG concentrations were to be stabilised, warming due to human activity and
11 the associated sea level rise would continue for centuries due to the timescales associated with
12 climate processes and feedbacks ((IPCC, 2001)). Burning of fossil fuels is not the only source of
13 GHGs. Notably, CO₂ and some methane (another significant GHG) are released from coal mining,
14 oil and gas production and natural gas transmission and distribution leaks. While this report focuses
15 on the energy sector, forest clearing and burning and land use change as well as the release of non-
16 CO₂ gases from industry, commerce and agriculture also contribute to global warming ((IPCC-
17 WG1, 2007)).

18
19 IPCC (AR4, 2007) projected that global average temperature will rise over this century by between
20 1.1 and 6.4° C depending on socio-economic scenarios ((Nakicenovic & Swart, 2000)). The adverse
21 impacts of such climate change (and the associated sea level rise) on water supply, ecosystems,
22 food security, human health and coastal settlements were assessed by IPCC (AR4, 2007). The
23 severity of the consequences of reaching irreversible tipping points in the climate system has led
24 many governments to advocate limiting temperature rises to no more than 2°C, as is noted by the
25 Copenhagen Accord of COP-15 in 2009.

26
27 It is the total concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere that directly affects the global temperature.
28 Carbon dioxide concentrations are increasing in the atmosphere because emission rates from fossil
29 fuels currently exceed the ability of natural sinks to absorb them (see Figure 1-1). Therefore the
30 concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere will continue to increase unless and until emissions
31 decrease to less than the rate that they can be removed from the atmosphere by the natural sinks of
32 the ocean and the terrestrial biosphere. Other GHGs such as nitrous oxide and industrial fluorinated
33 gases are also rising. Methane concentrations are now more than double those of preindustrial
34 levels, but their rise has slowed substantially in recent decades.



1
 2 **Figure 1.1.** Global CO₂ emissions and sinks. Historical data is gross emissions from fossil fuels
 3 and cement from 1860 to 2000. ‘Sinks’ is measured difference between gross emissions and
 4 increase in tonnage of CO₂ in atmosphere; it includes both land and ocean components, is
 5 moderately uncertain (as indicated by the band) and may change over time, in response to the
 6 atmospheric CO₂ concentration and changes in climate. Projected emission bands to 2100
 7 correspond to stabilisation of CO₂ concentrations at 570-660 ppm (upper band) and at 350-400
 8 ppm (lower band). Width of bands reflects spread of modelled results in AR4. These bands
 9 correspond to 710-885 ppm CO₂-eq and 445-490 ppm CO₂-eq respectively, and to equilibrium
 10 global average temperature increases of 4.0-4.9°C and 2.0-2.4°C above preindustrial, assuming
 11 AR4 best estimate of ‘climate sensitivity’. Using the ‘likely’ range of climate sensitivity, the
 12 corresponding temperature ranges would be wider: 2.7-7.2°C and 1.3-3.6°C respectively. Note
 13 that approaching equilibrium can take several centuries, especially for scenarios with higher levels
 14 of concentrations. Diagram adapted from IPCC- Synthesis (2007) Figure SPM-11, using sinks data
 15 from IPCC AR4 WG1 Table TS-1 and historical emissions from the (GCP, 2009) and (Boden,
 16 Marland, & Andres, 2009).


17 If global emissions continue at their current or higher levels until 2100 (upper band of Figure 1.1),
 18 then global average temperature is projected to increase by 4 to 4.9°C. To limit the average
 19 temperature increase to less than 2.4°C above preindustrial levels requires emissions to decrease
 20 sufficiently to stabilise CO₂ concentration below 400 ppm (lower band of Figure 1). This in turn
 21 implies that global emissions will have to decrease by at least 50-80% below current levels by 2050
 22 and begin to decrease (instead of their current increase) before year 2015. ((IPCC-Synthesis, 2007),
 23 Table SPM-6).

24
 25 Analysis of the economic cost of damages from climate change and of the costs of mitigation to
 26 avoid those damages (notably by (Stern, 2006) and (IPCC-WG3, 2007)) has also influenced
 27 thinking concerning potential mitigation options. Chapter 10 of this report indicates some of the
 28 many issues in any analysis of mitigation costs. These include debates over appropriate discount

1 rates and whether one utilizes a top down (usually more costly) or bottom up (usually less costly)
 2 analysis.

3 1.1.2 Factors increasing CO₂ emissions

4 Bioenergy (except for basic cooking, lighting and heating in developing countries) and other forms
 5 of early forms of RE (except hydropower) were largely replaced by abundant coal, petroleum and
 6 natural gas during the 20th century. The rapid rise in fossil fuels has produced a corresponding rapid
 7 growth in CO₂. See Figures 1.1 and 1.2.



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 35 **Figure 1.2** – Global Historical and Projected Marketed Energy Use by Fuel Type (EJ) 1980 to
 36 2006. Projected marketed energy use by fuel from 2007-2030. ((IEA, 2009d)).

37 In developing strategies for reducing CO₂ emissions it is useful to use the Kaya identity that
 38 decomposes energy related CO₂ emissions into four factors: 1) Population, 2) GDP per capita, 3)
 39 energy intensity (i.e. total primary energy supply (TPES) per GDP) and 4) carbon intensity (i.e. CO₂
 40 emissions per TPES) ((Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971); (Kaya, 1990)).


41
$$CO_2 = \text{Population} \times (\text{GDP}/\text{population}) \times (\text{TPES}/\text{GDP}) \times (CO_2/\text{TPES})$$

42 This is sometimes referred to as

43
$$CO_2 = \text{Population} \times \text{Affluence} \times \text{Energy intensity} \times \text{Carbon intensity}$$

44 The absolute (a) and percentage (b) changes of global CO₂ emissions decomposed into the Kaya
 45 factors are shown in Figure 1.3, ((Edenhofer, Knopf, & al., 2010)).

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
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3 **Figure 1.3:** Kaya decomposition of global energy related CO₂ emissions by population (red), GDP
 4 per capita (orange), energy intensity (grey) and carbon intensity (green) from 1971 to 2007. Total
 5 annual changes are indicated by a black triangle. Part (a) Absolute changes; Part (b) percentage
 6 changes. Data source: (IEA, 2009d)

7

8 While GDP per capita and population growth had the largest effect on emissions growth in earlier
 9 decades, decreasing energy intensity significantly slowed emissions growth in the period from 1971
 10 to 2007. In the past, expansion of nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly driven by
 11 Annex I countries, caused carbon intensity to fall. In recent years (2000 – 2007), increases in carbon
 12 intensity have mainly been driven by the expansion of coal use by both developed and developing
 13 countries, although coal and petroleum use have fallen slightly since 2007. Since the early 2000s
 14 the energy supply has become more carbon intense, thereby amplifying the increase resulting from
 15 growth in GDP/capita.

16 In Figure 1.4 absolute emissions growth is examined on terms of different countries and country
 17 groups between 1971 and 2007. Historically developed countries have contributed the most to
 18 global emissions, but developing country annual emissions have risen to more than half of the total,
 19 and China surpassed the U.S. on annual emissions ((Edenhofer, et al., 2010)). Developed countries
 20 still have the highest total historical emissions and largest emissions per capita.



1
2 **Figure 1.4:** Emission growth decomposed by different countries/country groups. ‘Other Newly
3 Industrializing Countries’ (NIC) includes Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea.
4 Data source: (IEA, 2009c).

5 Shifting from carbon intensive fossil fuels to alternative low carbon sources can help to lower CO₂
6 emissions and avoid severe climate change. It will be essential for all countries, beginning with the
7 most intensive energy users, to find ways to meet energy service needs with less energy and less
8 carbon-intensive energy sources. This report explores the potential for low carbon RE sources in
9 combination with increased energy efficiency to meet the GHG reduction goals set by policy
10 makers to reduce the extent of future climate change.

11 **1.1.3 What is Renewable Energy and what is its role in addressing climate change?**

12 Renewable energy (RE) is any form of energy from geophysical or biological sources that is
13 replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. As long as the rate of
14 extraction of this energy does not exceed the natural energy flow rate, then the resource can be
15 utilized for the indefinite future, and may be considered as “inexhaustible.” Not all energy classified
16 as ‘renewable’ is necessarily inexhaustible; e.g. it is possible to utilize biomass at a greater rate than
17 it can grow, or to draw heat from a geothermal field at a faster rate than heat flows can replenish it.
18 By contrast, the rate of utilization of direct solar energy has no bearing on the rate at which it
19 reaches the earth.

20
21 Most forms of RE produce little or no CO₂emissions, which makes them useful tools for addressing
22 climate change. It is important to assess the entire life-cycle of each energy source to ensure that all
23 of the dimensions of sustainability are met. For a RE resource to be *sustainable*, it must be
24 inexhaustible and not damage the delivery of environmental goods and services including the
25 climate system. For example, to be sustainable, biofuel production should not increase net
26 CO₂emissions, should not adversely affect food security, or require excessive use of water and
27 chemicals or threaten biodiversity To be sustainable, energy must also be economically affordable
28 over the long term, it must meet societal needs and be compatible with social norms now and in the
29 future. Indeed, as use of renewable energy technologies accelerates, a balance will have to be struck
30 among the several dimensions of sustainable development.

31
32 Each RE technology has a specific set of associated environmental impacts, and the resource may
33 be affected by climate change. These aspects are discussed in the ‘technology’ chapters of this

1 report. The RE sources examined in this report are categorised as bioenergy (ch.2), direct solar
2 energy (ch.3), geothermal (ch.4), hydropower (ch.5), ocean energy (ch.6) and wind energy (ch.7).

3 1.1.4 Why a special report on renewable energy

4 The IPCC Scoping Meeting on Renewable Energy Sources held in January 2008 in Lübeck,
5 Germany, was convened to determine whether a special report was necessary, and what such a
6 report might cover. The participants concluded that a Special Report would be appropriate for a
7 number of reasons ((Hohmeyer, 2008)). First, RE technology is already being deployed at a rapidly
8 growing rate, and in combination with energy efficiency, is likely to contribute substantially to
9 climate change mitigation by 2030 and has the potential to contribute a major portion of energy
10 supply by 2100. Second, since the publication of the AR4, various stakeholders from governments,
11 civil society and the private sector have asked for more information and more extensive coverage of
12 renewable energy sources, particularly in regions where specific information was lacking.
13 Consequently, this Special Report on Renewable Energy provides information for policy makers,
14 the private sector and civil society on:

- 15 1. Identification of RE resource and available technologies by region and impacts of climate
16 change on these resources;
- 17 2. Mitigation potential of RE sources;
- 18 3. Linkages between RE growth and co-benefits in achieving sustainable development by region;
- 19 4. Impacts on global, regional and national energy security;
- 20 5. Technology and market status, future developments and projected rates of deployment;
- 21 6. Options and constraints for integration into the energy supply system and other markets,
22 including energy storage options;
- 23 7. Economic and environmental costs, benefits, risks and impacts of deployment;
- 24 8. Capacity building, technology transfer and financing in different regions;
- 25 9. Policy options, outcomes and conditions for effectiveness; and
- 26 10. Scenarios that demonstrate how accelerated deployment might be achieved in a sustainable
27 manner.

28 1.1.5 Options for mitigation

29 Many studies suggest a strong correlation between economic growth and energy use, and since
30 nearly 85% of global primary energy comes from fossil fuels, that economic growth is correlated
31 with CO2 emissions as well. This has lead many to conclude that emissions are essential to
32 development. There are however, a number of developed countries with very low emissions such as
33 Norway that rely heavily on RE to supply energy services. Near term energy supply appears
34 adequate to supply most energy services in most of the developed countries ((IEA, 2009d)).
35

36 In most developing countries, on the other hand, many people lack even basic energy services and
37 especially those that are supplied by electricity. Since it is energy services and not energy that
38 people need, it is possible to meet those needs in an efficient manner that requires less primary
39 energy consumption with low carbon technologies that minimise CO2 emissions ((Haas, et al.,
40 2008)).The long-term energy scenarios analysed in chapter 10 expect high growth rates of energy
41 consumption in developing countries, so that energy supply with low energy and carbon intensities
42 is indispensable to reducing CO2 emissions.
43

1 There are multiple means for lowering the heat trapping emissions from energy sources, while still
2 providing energy services. RE and demand side energy efficiency work synergistically to lower the
3 energy required to provide each end use energy service by lowering power density demands to
4 match those of RE supply ((Pacala & Socolow, 2004); (IPCC, 2007)).

5 The following mitigation options related to energy supply are relevant:

- 6 • Shift to zero carbon primary RE sources such as solar, geothermal, hydropower, oceans and
7 wind.
- 8 • Shift from coal, petroleum or natural gas to solid, liquid or gaseous biomass energy that is
9 produced in a low-carbon emitting manner.
- 10 • Utilize combined heat and power technologies for thermal production of electric power from
11 both fossil fuels and renewable energy sources.
- 12 • Switch from fossil fuels with high specific CO₂ emissions (especially coal) to fossil fuels
13 with lower specific CO₂ emissions (especially natural gas) or to nuclear power.
- 14 • Utilize carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to prevent fossil fuel combustion
15 products from entering the atmosphere. CCS has the potential to remove carbon dioxide
16 from the atmosphere when biofuels are burned.
- 17 • Reduce the release of black carbon particulates from diesel engines and other combustion
18 sources and from the burning of biomass fuels.

19 The main mitigation options related to energy demand are as follows:

- 20 • Provide the same energy service with less energy. Energy savings of 50 to 80% have been
21 identified for providing specific services in buildings, industrial processes and transportation
22 throughout all economies (Weizsäcker, Club of Rome., & Natural Edge Project., 2009).
- 23 • Change consumer behaviours to use fewer carbon and energy-intensive products and
24 services.

25 Alternative means of reducing GHGs include

- 26 • Utilize forests, soils and grassland sinks to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
- 27 • Reduce non-CO₂ heat trapping greenhouse gases (CH₄, N₂O, HFC, SF₆)

28 Geoengineer solutions

- 29 • Address other aspects of the heat balance of the earth such as increasing surface albedo,
30 atmospheric light scattering or ocean fertilization to increase CO₂ absorption from the
31 atmosphere.

32
33 The geo-engineering ‘solutions’ that are sometimes suggested to moderate climate change may
34 address global warming, but leave untouched the unsustainable use of energy resources or the GHG
35 emissions which are causing that problem. These efforts may also cause unanticipated
36 biogeophysical and social problems. For example, deliberately releasing large quantities of sulphate
37 aerosols into the atmosphere to reduce the amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface
38 will not address the increasing acidification of the oceans by CO₂ or the growing air pollution and
39 ozone in cities by the increasing number of motor cars on the road ((Robock, Marquardt, Kravitz, &
40 Stenchikov, 2009); (RoyalSociety, 2009)).


41 This report focuses on substitution of low carbon, RE supply to reduce heat trapping carbon
42 dioxide, and will examining the synergies between RE and energy end -use efficiency.

1 1.1.6 Role of renewable energy in addressing co-issues of climate change (energy
2 security, employment, MDGs and sustainability goals)

3 Three major concerns about energy use motivate the consideration of RE: price, environmental
4 impacts, development and energy security.

5 Despite the worldwide economic recession of 2008-2009, oil prices will likely continue to rise over
6 the medium to long term with economic recovery in the absence of other market drivers ((IEA,
7 2009d)). Price volatility of petroleum and natural gas has created economic problems for most
8 countries, and price spikes have been especially hard on poorer nations that must import their
9 transportation fuels. Liquid biofuels and renewably generated electricity offer promise as potential
10 alternatives for the transportation sector, and as a variety of RE sources are found throughout the
11 world, countries can utilize locally available resources. A diversified and expanded supply of
12 energy may act to lower the long-run price of all fuels and reduce price volatility benefitting all
13 energy users ((Bartis, Camm, & Ortiz, 2008)). These benefits could accrue nationally even if one
14 sector were to continue using fuels derived from conventional petroleum because of the
15 displacement of other users of petroleum derived energy.

16
17 There are generally increased public and government expectations in all parts of the world for
18 better environmental performance. The contribution to global GHG reductions as RE replaces non-
19 sustainable energy sources is valued for this reason, but so too may be a reduction in local
20 environmental impacts. Producing electricity with wind and PV solar require very little water
21 compared to thermal conversion technologies. In addition, wind, PV, ocean and hydro technologies
22 produce very little waste heat. Water demand for cooling thermal power generation is becoming a
23 significant limitation for siting new thermal power stations including coal, biomass, gas, nuclear,
24 solar concentrating power and geothermal, There have been necessary power reductions during
25 drought conditions in the United States and France in recent years. Most renewable technologies
26 produce lower conventional air and water pollutants than fossil fuels, but hydropower and biofuels
27 require large amounts of land and water. See Figure 1.5. Chapter 9 of this report elaborates on many
28 of the ways in which RE can contribute to sustainable development, in addition to mitigating
29 climate change.



1
 2 **Figure 1.5.** Comparison of co-benefits, water use and CO2 emissions associated with primary
 3 energy sources for electricity power generation. Not included are land impacts from surface mining of coal,
 4 land clearance for bioenergy and hydro reservoirs or methane leakage from coal natural gas and petroleum
 5 production and use, or damage from oil spills and coal ash storage. **TSU:**
 6 **Source? Legend?**

7 In developing countries, increasing the availability of energy services is central to sustainable
 8 development and poverty reduction efforts. It affects all aspects of development -- social, economic,
 9 and environmental -- including livelihoods, access to water, agricultural productivity, health,
 10 population levels, education, and gender-related issues. None of the *Millennium Development Goals*
 11 (MDGs) can be met without major improvement in the quality and quantity of energy services in
 12 developing countries. RE sources represent an important opportunity for developing countries, since
 13 access to energy is a key factor in combating poverty ((Cherian, 2007)). A large proportion of the
 14 population in these countries live in rural areas. The lack of transmission grids makes conventional
 15 energy supply challenging in such locations. The decentralised nature of some RE options offers the
 16 opportunity to provide a basic energy supplies through an off grid system ((BMU, 2008)). In this
 17 way, RE could provide access to modern energy services, particularly electricity, for a large number
 18 of people, which in turn improves living conditions and opportunities for economic development.
 19 For example, modern energy services can support MDG goal 1 of eradicating extreme poverty and
 20 hunger by freeing up household time from gathering firewood. This time can be reallocated to
 21 tending agricultural tasks, improving agriculture productivity and developing micro-industries to
 22 build assets, increase income, and financial well being of rural communities ((UNDP, 2006)).
 23 Production and utilisation of RE can also spur rural and economic development, providing
 24 opportunities for farmers and entrepreneurs to produce feedstocks for RE production and participate

1 as owners of production facilities across all types of RE. Agriculture remains one of the most
2 significant economic activities for large portions of the world. Hence renewable provides many
3 rural economic development opportunities, ranging from improved energy access to industrial
4 development, i.e., through wind power and biomass manufacturing and production facilities being
5 located primarily in rural areas ((WIREC, 2008)). The opportunities culminate in improved income,
6 job creation, and improved education, health care, distributive computing, telecommunications and
7 public services. International energy assistance may provide a low-cost, effective opportunity to
8 reduce future growth in greenhouse gas emissions and oil consumption before current development
9 patterns become increasingly locked in throughout the developing world ((Hassell, et al., 2009))
10 Developing, installing and servicing RE resources and technologies is an effective creator of new
11 employment in developed countries as well ((Wei, Patadia, & Kammen, 2010); (AIA, 2009);
12 (BMU, 2009)).

13
14 National security concerns about the geopolitical availability of fuels has also been a major driver
15 for many countries to consider RE. For example in the U.S, the military has led the effort to expand
16 and diversify fuel supplies for aviation and cites improved energy supply security as the major
17 driving force for sustainable alternative fuels ((Secretary of the Airforce, 2009 #71); (Hileman, et
18 al., 2009); (USDoD, 2010)). Chapter 9 further expands upon the benefits of RE beyond climate
19 impact mitigation and its role in sustainable development.

20 1.1.7 Trends in International Policy for RE

21 The international community's discussions of RE go back three decades to the fuel crises of the
22 1970s, when many countries began exploring alternative energy sources. Since then, various
23 attempts have been made to ensure RE featured prominently in the United Nations agenda on
24 environment and development through various initiatives and actions (WIREC, 2008), including:

- 25 1. 1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, which adopted the Nairobi
26 Programme of Action; the 1992
- 27 2. UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and
28 Action Plan for implementing Sustainable development that addressed sustainable energy and
29 protection of the atmosphere;
- 30 3. 2001 session of the UN commission on Sustainable Development through its decision "Energy
31 for Sustainable Development", which highlighted the importance of RE;
- 32 4. 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg-South Africa, when
33 several RE Partnerships were signed;
- 34 5. Bonn RE Conference 2004, which addressed best practices, research and policy development,
35 energy services, and MDGs;
- 36 6. Beijing RE Conference (BIREC) 2005;
- 37 7. Washington RE Conference (WIREC) 2008.

38 These meetings all agreed on an evolving holistic view of energy for sustainable development
39 which has three major pillars, as highlighted in Chapters 1, 9 and 11 of this report, namely the need
40 for: (1) more efficient use of energy, in industrial applications, transportation, buildings and
41 especially in the delivery of energy services at the point of end-use, (2) increased utilization of RE
42 and low-carbon energy can reduce pollution and anthropogenic climate change in the short and
43 long-term while having additional co-benefits of lower air and water pollution, and (3) accelerated
44 research, development and deployment of new and more efficient energy technologies that offer

1 enhanced delivery of energy services can accelerate the introduction of energy efficient
2 technologies and practices, RE and other low carbon emitting energy systems.
3 The International Energy Agency (IEA) has provided a forum for discussing energy issues among
4 OECD industrialised countries. A new international organisation has also been established
5 especially for RE in 2009 that currently has 143 member countries and the EU: the International RE
6 Agency (IRENA).

7 **1.2 Summary of RE resources**

8 1.2.1 Resource advantages of RE

9 *1.2.1.1 Wide distribution and low recurrent cost*

10 Various forms of RE resources are far more uniformly distributed among all nations than are fossil
11 fuels and uranium. Thus, from an energy security perspective, they are more available to more
12 countries than other energy resources.

13
14 Primary energy for wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and ocean is free and it is delivered at no cost to
15 the energy conversion technology. Furthermore, the capital costs for building the technology to
16 extract and convert primary energy to a useful secondary form are known at the time of
17 construction. Hence the price of delivered energy in the form of electricity, heat or mechanical
18 energy is known with considerable certainty for the life of the project. Land based large-scale wind,
19 hydro, geothermal and solar electric projects may require considerable investment in transmission
20 infrastructure similar to that required for large central fossil and uranium fuelled power stations.
21 Because population density is high along coastlines, offshore wind projects are relatively close to
22 the demand, and require less extensive transmission systems. Distributed technologies such as
23 rooftop solar PV deliver the electricity where it is made eliminating the need for transmission even
24 when grid connected. For the world's poor who utilize wood, dung and crop residues for cooking
25 and heating biofuels are available locally and can be gathered with their own labour with no market
26 cost.

27 *1.2.1.2 Scalability of RE technology*

28 Some analyses conclude that only very large facilities such as nuclear power, large scale hydro or
29 large coal plants with carbon capture and storage can be scaled up rapidly enough to meet CO₂
30 reduction goals ((MIT, 2003, 2007, 2009)). However, the rapid introduction of natural gas fired
31 turbines during the past 20 years in North America and Europe demonstrates that modular scaling to
32 produce sufficient modestly sized energy units can meet a large scale energy demand. This has
33 important implications for RE.

34
35 Many renewable technologies such a solar PV, solar thermal, wind turbines and wave devices are
36 modular in nature and can be readily and rapidly produced in conventional manufacturing facilities.
37 This has the advantage of introducing additional production capacity in incremental amounts that
38 more closely approximate the growth in demand rather than having to wait for the completion of
39 very large, single power generation facilities. This lowers borrowing costs that have proven to be a
40 major contribution to the costs of nuclear power plants. At current rates of production, it appears
41 that wind, solar and biomass have all demonstrated that they can be manufactured at a rate that can
42 meet growing demand. Wind and solar capacity production is currently doubling in three years or
43 less, and the U.S. bioethanol program has achieved significant growth in three years to pass Brazil
44 as the largest producer ((REN21, 2009a)).

45 1.2.2 Resource disadvantages of RE

1 Chapter 8 of this report discusses two issues in utilising RE for electric power:

- 2 • available for dispatch when needed. On the other hand, some RE resources are matched to
 3 Some renewable resources such as wind and solar are variable and may not always be
 4 demand such as solar electricity and air conditioning, and some energy services such as
 5 water pumping, purification or desalination can be provided whenever the energy source is
 6 available. Linked hybrid systems of multiple renewable sources significantly increase the
 7 capacity factor for the entire system, and this can be augmented with electric and thermal
 8 storage.
- 9 • The energy density of many renewable sources is relatively low, so that their power levels
 10 may be insufficient on their own for some purposes such as very large-scale industrial
 11 facilities. This is why providing end use energy services more efficiently is often a major
 12 factor in the utility of some renewable technologies. See chapter 8 for further discussion

13 1.2.3 Resource potential

14 The theoretical potential for RE is much greater than all of the energy that is used by all the
 15 economies on earth. The challenge is to capture it and utilize it to provide desired energy services in
 16 a cost effective manner. Estimated fluxes of RE and a comparison with fossil fuel reserves and 2007
 17 annual consumption of approximately 500 Exajoules/year are provided in Table 1.1.

18 **Table 1.1:** RE fluxes compared to annual energy use.

Renewable source	Annual flux	Ratio Annual energy flux/ annual demand	Total reserve
Solar	3,900,000 EJ/y*	8,700	---
Wind	6,000 EJ/y*	13	---
Hydro	149 EJ/y*	0.33	---
Bioenergy	2,900 EJ/y*	6.5	---
Ocean	7,400 EJ/y*	17	---
Geothermal	140,000,000 EJ/y*	31,000	---
Annual Primary energy source	Annual Use	Lifetime of Proven Reserve	Total Reserve
Total energy fossil fuel used/y	411 EJ/y**	111 years	46,700 EJ
Total Uranium used/y	10 EJ/y**	100 – 350 years	1,000- 3,500 EJ
Total RE used/y	61 EJ/y	---	---
Current Global Energy Use/y	482 EJ/y (2007)**	1	---

19 Sources: *IEA, World Energy Outlook 2000 and 2004, **IEA, 2009 converted to direct equivalent
 20 method (Appendix II), *** IEA, 2006.

21

1 The literature related to the technical potential supply of these RE types varies considerably
 2 (technology chapters contain details and references). Among other things, this variation exists in
 3 due to differences in calculation method, variant definitions of technical potential and variation due
 4 to differences between reviewers on how technologies and resource capture techniques may change
 5 over time. Table 1.2 provides an abbreviated list of the major resource types, associated
 6 technologies, the status of their development and the typical or primary distribution method
 7 (centralized network / grid required or decentralized, local standalone supply). Further details
 8 related to these technologies and types are provided in their respective chapters.
 9

10 **Table 1.2: Overview of Renewable Energy technologies and applications**

Renewable Energy Source	Select Renewable Energy Technologies	Energy Sector (Electricity, Thermal, Transport, Mechanical)	Technology Maturity*				Primary Distribution Method**		
			R & D	Demo & Pilot Proj	Early-Stage Com'l	Later-Stage Com'l	Centralized	Decentralized	
Bioenergy	Non-Commercial Use of Fuelwood/Charcoal	Thermal				X		X	
	Cookstoves (Primitive and Advanced)	Thermal				X		X	
	Domestic Heating Systems (pellet based)	Thermal				X		X	
	Small- and Large-Scale Boilers	Thermal				X		X	
	Digestion	Electricity/Thermal				X		X	
	Combined Heat and Power (CHP)	Electricity/Thermal				X		X	
	Co-firing in Fossil-Fuel Power Plant	Electricity				X		X	
	Combustion-based Power Plant	Electricity				X		X	
	Gasification-based Power Plant	Electricity				X		X	
	Sugar-Cane Ethanol Production	Transport			X			X	
	Corn Ethanol Production	Transport			X			X	
	Wheat Ethanol Production	Transport			X			X	
	Rapeseed Biodiesel Production	Transport			X			X	
	Palm Oil Biodiesel Production	Transport			X			X	
	Soy Biodiesel Production	Transport			X			X	
	Jathropa Biodiesel Production	Transport			X			X	
	Lignocellulose Ethanol Production	Transport			X			X	
	Lignocellulose Syntfuel Production	Transport			X			X	
	Algae Fuel Production	Transport		X				X	
	Direct Solar	Photovoltaic (PV)	Electricity					X	
Concentrating PV (CPV)		Electricity		X			X		
Concentrating Solar Thermal (CSP)		Electricity			X		X		
Low Temperature Solar Thermal		Thermal				X			
Solar Cooling		Thermal		X				X	
Passive Solar Architecture		Thermal				X		X	
Solar Cooking		Thermal			X			X	
Solar Fuels		Transport	X				X	X	
Geothermal		Hydrothermal, Condensing Flash	Electricity				X		
		Hydrothermal, Binary Cycle	Electricity				X		
	Engineered Geothermal Systems (EGS)	Electricity		X			X		
	Submarine Geothermal	Electricity	X				X		
	Direct Use Applications	Thermal				X		X	
	Geothermal Heat Pumps (GHP)	Thermal				X		X	
Hydropower	Run-of-River	Electricity/Mechanical				X		X	
	Reservoirs	Electricity				X			
	Pumped Storage	Electricity				X			
	Hydrokinetic Turbines	Electricity/Mechanical		X			X	X	
Ocean Energy	Swell/Wave	Electricity		X			X		
	Tidal Rise and Fall	Electricity				X			
	Tidal Currents	Electricity		X			X		
	Ocean Currents	Electricity		X			X		
	Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion	Electricity/Thermal		X			X		
	Osmotic Power	Electricity		X			X		
	Marine Biomass Farming	Transport	X				X		
	Wind Energy	On-shore, Large Turbines	Electricity				X		
Off-shore, Large Turbines		Electricity			X		X		
Distributed, Small Turbines		Electricity				X		X	
Turbines for Water Pumping / Other Mechanical		Mechanical				X		X	
Wind Kites and Sails		Transport		X				X	
Higher-Altitude Wind Generators		Electricity	X				X		

* The highest level of maturity within each technology category is identified in the table; less mature technologies exist within some technology categories.

** Centralized refers to energy supply that is distributed to end users through a network; decentralized refers to energy supply that is created onsite. Categorization is based on 'primary' distribution method, recognizing that virtually all technologies can, in some circumstances, be used in both a centralized and decentralised fashion.

11
 12 **[TSU: Source?]**

13 We define technical potential as the *amount of RE output obtainable by full implementation of*
 14 *demonstrated and likely to develop technologies or practices.*¹ A recent publication, released by

¹ The glossary provides a more comprehensive definition of this term.

1 the German Federal Ministry of the Environment (Krewitt, Nienhaus, Klessmann, Capone, & al.,
 2 2009) has surveyed many of the relevant articles and provided a consistent set of tables on the
 3 technical potential summarized in Table 1.3 below.² The range of technical potential, not defined
 4 in Table 1.3, is addressed both in (Krewitt, et al., 2009) and in each of the related chapters in this
 5 document. The table contains details on the sources for the higher and lower estimates.

6
7

Table 1.3: Technical potential for renewable energy (EJ/y).

Energy	Technical Resource Potential (EJ/y)					Sources for Range of Estimates ²	
	Krewitt et al. (2009) ¹			Range of Estimates			
	2020	2030	2050	Low	High		
Electric Power (EJ/y)	Solar PV ³	1,126	1,351	1,689	1,338	14,766	(Krewitt, et al., 2009); Chapter 3 reports total range of solar electric potential (PV and CSP) of 1440 to 50,400 EJ/y
	Solar CSP ³	5,156	6,187	8,043	248	10,603	(Krewitt, et al., 2009); Chapter 3 reports total range of solar electric potential (PV and CSP) of 1440 to 50,400 EJ/y
	Geothermal	5	18	45	1	144	(Krewitt, et al., 2009)
	Hydropower	48	49	50	45	52	(Krewitt, et al., 2009)
	Ocean	66	166	331	330	331	(Krewitt, et al., 2009)
	Wind On-shore	362	369	379	70	1,000	Chapter 7: low estimate from (WEC, 1994), high estimate from (WBGU, 2004) and includes off-shore
	Wind Off-shore	26	36	57	15	130	Chapter 7: low estimate from (Fellows, 2000), high estimate from (Leutz, Ackermann, Suzuki, Akisawa, & Kashiwagi, 2001)
Heat (EJ/y)	Solar	113	117	123	na	na	(Krewitt, et al., 2009)
	Geothermal	104	312	1,040	4	12,590	(Krewitt, et al., 2009)
Primary Energy (EJ/y) ⁴	Biomass Energy Crops ⁵	43	61	96	49	260	Chapter 2 (higher quality lands): large number of studies and several recent assessments, e.g., (Dornburg, van Vuuren, van de Ven, Leangeveld, & al., 2010)
					10	70	Chapter 2 (marginal/degraded lands): large number of studies and several recent assessments, e.g., (Dornburg, et al., 2010)
	Biomass Residues	59	68	88	100	200	Chapter 2: large number of studies and several recent assessments, e.g., (Dornburg, et al., 2010)
IEA Forecast (EJ/y) ⁶	BAU Primary Energy	605	703	868 ⁷			
	450ppm Scenario	586	601				

8 1. Technical potential estimates for 2020, 2030, and 2050 are based on a review of studies in (Krewitt, et al., 2009); data presented in
 9 Chapters 2-7 may disagree with these figures due to differing methodologies.
 10 2. Range of estimates comes from studies reviewed by (Krewitt, et al., 2009) as revised based on data presented in Chapters 2-7.
 11 3. Estimates for PV and CSP from (Krewitt, et al., 2009) for 2020, 2030, and 2050 are based on different data and methodologies, which
 12 tend to significantly understate the technical potential for PV relative to CSP.

² The definition of technical potential in Krewitt, *et al.* (2009), p. 75 is similar to the definition here in that it is bounded by local / geographical availability and technological limitations associated with conversion efficiencies and the capture and transfer of the energy.

4. Primary energy from biomass could be used to meet electricity, thermal, or transportation needs, all with a conversion loss from primary energy ranging from roughly 20% to 80%.
5. Even the high-end estimates presented here take into account key limitations with respect to food demand, water availability, biodiversity and land quality.
6. IEA (2009)
7. DLR (2008)

The table provides a perspective for the reader to understand the relative sizes of the RE resources in the context of demand for energy in the future. Both the technical potentials and future demand are highly uncertain; further refinement of the values adds little to the discussion. Issues related to technology evolution, sustainability, resource availability, land use and other factors that relate to this potential are explored in the various chapters. Analysis related to the technical potentials as defined in Table 1.3 and their impact on climate change are addressed in chapter 10.

Note also that one cannot necessarily add the various types of energy together to estimate a total. For example, one cannot assume that the total electric power available is the sum of those represented in the “Electric Power” section because each type was estimated independently of the others and, as such, there may be overlap or double counting (i.e., the assessment did not take into account land use allocation; one cannot have both PV and CSP occupying the same space even though a particular site was suitable for either of them).

While the resource is obviously large and could theoretically supply all energy needs long into the future, cost issues place further constraints on the exploitation of these resources. Table 1.4 provides data related to costs associated with the various technologies. Cost data were gathered from a variety of sources in the available literature; details can be found in respective chapters and a data table defining costs can be found in appendix III. All costs were assessed using standard discounting analysis at 3%, 7% and 10% as described in the appendix on methodology. The following default assumptions were made to define the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) if data were unavailable:

- time of construction - one year, no production during that year
- O&M costs - constant over lifetime
- production - start after commissioning at (nameplate capacity x Capacity Factor)
- lifetime - excludes years of construction
- retrofit or other major costs during regular lifetime -assumed to be included as annuity in O&M costs, i.e., constant costs after construction
- decommissioning - costs not included in LCOE
- Lower bound = lower bound of capital and O&M cost, higher bound of capacity factor (CF) and lifetime
- Higher bound = higher bound of capital and O&M cost, lower bound of CF and lifetime

Table 1.4: Levelized Cost of Energy (2005 US\$/kWh)

Source	RE technology	LCOE at 3%		LCOE at 7%		LCOE at 10%		Learning Rate (%)	
		<i>lower bound</i>	<i>higher bound</i>	<i>lower bound</i>	<i>higher bound</i>	<i>lower bound</i>	<i>higher bound</i>	<i>lower bound</i>	<i>higher bound</i>
Direct Solar Energy	PV, res roof	0.20	0.50	0.31	0.69	0.40	0.85	11	19
	PV, com roof	0.17	0.46	0.26	0.64	0.34	0.79	11	19
	PV, fixed tilt	0.11	0.25	0.17	0.34	0.22	0.42	11	19
	PV, 1-axis	0.10	0.28	0.15	0.38	0.19	0.47	11	19

	CSP	0.11	0.19	0.16	0.25	0.20	0.31	2	15
Geothermal Energy	Condensing-flash	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.13		
	Binary-cycle	0.03	0.11	0.04	0.14	0.05	0.17		
	Enhanced Geo Sys								
Hydro		0.01	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.11		
Ocean Energy	Wave Energy								
	Tidal Current								
	OTEC								
	Salinity Gradient								
Wind Energy	On-shore, Large	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.13	0.05	0.15	10	17
	Off-shore, Large	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.12	0.20		

1 Source: Various chapters provide cost details and a summary is provided in appendix III. Biomass is excluded due to high variation
 2 in costs; for details, see Chapter 2.

3 These costs are based on the most recent information available in the literature; some
 4 documentation exists for the rate at which the costs might come down in the future based on a
 5 doubling of the production of the technology. The final columns in Table 1.4 provide this Learning
 6 Rate for the technologies where such information was available.

7 Data on biomass sourced energy show great variation in costs based on local conditions, biomass
 8 supply and other factors. That said, there are significant uncertainties surrounding the costs in
 9 Table 1.4 and, as with technical potential, the data are meant to provide context for comparison. In
 10 viewing the table, one needs also to consider other factors that have an impact on the final cost of
 11 the electricity to the consumer: typical capacities, dispatchability, socio-economic conditions, grid
 12 requirements, capacity factor variations, etc. These too are addressed in the various chapters.

13 **1.3 Current Status of RE in Meeting Energy Service Needs**

14 **1.3.1 Energy Flows and Metrics**


15 *1.3.1.1 Energy pathways from source to end-use*

16 In a typical energy system, consumers (the demand side) wish to receive specific services provided
 17 by the energy delivered to them by producers (supply side). Energy sources typically require
 18 transformation into secondary energy carriers, which then deliver energy to the point of end use.
 19 Energy is then transformed by appropriate technologies to provide the service demanded. RE
 20 sources can serve as a primary energy supply.

21 To meet a requirement for an energy service (e.g., lighting) a primary [renewable] energy source
 22 (e.g., geothermal energy) is transformed into a secondary energy carrier (e.g., electricity) that can be
 23 transformed again into a form (e.g., light) that performs the desired service. Such an end-use is
 24 often attributed to one of the four end-use sectors (buildings, transportation, industry, agriculture).

25 Economies are driven by energy. Over 80% of primary energy comes from the combustion of fossil
 26 fuels, which are the source of 60% of GHGs ((IPCC, 2007)). Hydropower, nuclear energy and a
 27 portfolio of renewable sources provide the remainder of non-CO₂ emitting energy. To maintain both
 28 a sustainable economy that is capable of providing essential goods and services to the citizens of
 29 both developed and developing countries, and to maintain a supportive global climate system

1 requires a major shift in how energy is supplied and utilized. There is a multi-step process whereby
 2 primary energy is converted into an energy carrier (heat, electricity or mechanical work), and then
 3 into an energy service. This is illustrated in Figure 1.6.



4
 5 **Figure 1.6.** The Path of Energy from Source to Service. The Energy services delivered to the
 6 users can be provided with differing amounts of end use energy. This in turn can be provided with
 7 more or less primary energy from different sources, and with differing emissions of CO₂ and other
 8 environmental impacts. [TSU: Source?]

9 Thermal conversion processes to produce electricity (including from biomass and geothermal)
 10 suffer losses of approximately 50-90% and losses of around 80% to supply the mechanical energy
 11 needed for transport. These conversion losses raise the share of primary energy from fossil fuels,
 12 and the wasted heat from fossil fuel combustion is the primary source of CO₂ ((LLNL, 2009);
 13 (Sterner, 2009)). Direct energy conversions from solar, hydro, ocean and wind energy to electricity
 14 do not suffer these thermal losses. Hence primary energy requirements are much smaller for these
 15 forms of RE than for fossil fuel, biomass combustion or for nuclear power. Stored solar heat in the
 16 ground, water and air may be efficiently captured utilizing heat pumps, which will not produce CO₂
 17 emissions if powered by a RE source such as wind or solar. Solar direct heating and day lighting are
 18 also direct energy transfers without conversion losses, and direct heating from geothermal, biomass
 19 and solar thermal systems can also be highly efficient processes. By comparison, CCS requires
 20 substantial energy inputs, which would increase the demand for primary energy to supply the same
 21 amount of end use energy for energy services. It is important to recognize this when accounting for
 22 primary energy using different methodologies (Section 1.3.1.2)

23 Figure 1.6 can be used as an organizing tool for conducting a life cycle assessment (LCA) of
 24 specific energy options to meet alternative energy service needs in different end use sectors. It can
 25 help to identify where energy transformation losses and environmental impacts including GHG
 26 emissions occur. Similarly, Life Cycle Assessment can become the basis of a systemic analysis of
 27 costs, highlighting where economic savings might be achieved. Utilizing this approach can help to
 28 identify the most cost effective, most energy efficient and least environmentally damaging strategy
 29 for meeting a particular energy service such as lighting, cooking or an industrial process. It is
 30 especially helpful in identifying energy savings through reduction of energy transformation losses,
 31 and reduction in end use demand ((Huber & Mills, 2005)).

1 *1.3.1.2 Methodology and Units Used in this report*

2 In this report Joules are used (usually ExaJoules = 10^{18} Joules) when discussing and comparing
3 different forms of energy, and Watthours may be used for electricity (Usually TeraWatt hours =
4 10^{12} Watthours). See the glossary for definitions of terms.

5 Different energy analyses use a variety of accounting methods that lead to different quantitative
6 outcomes for both reporting of current primary energy use and energy use in scenarios that explore
7 future energy transitions. Energy accounting systems are utilized in the literature often without a
8 clear statement as to which system is being used ((Lightfoot, 2007), (E. Martinot, Dienst, Weiliang,
9 & Qimin, 2007)). A comprehensive overview of differences in primary energy accounting from
10 different statistics has been described ((Macknick, 2009)) and the implications of applying different
11 accounting systems in long-term scenario analysis were illustrated by Nakicenovic *et al.*,
12 ((Nakicenovic, Grubler, & McDonald, 1998).

13 Three alternative methods are predominantly used to report primary energy. While the accounting
14 of combustible sources, including all fossil energy forms and biomass, is unambiguous and identical
15 across the different methods, they feature different conventions on how to calculate primary energy
16 supplied by non-combustible energy sources, i.e. nuclear energy and all RE sources except biomass.
17 These methods are:

- 18 • *the physical energy content method* adopted, for example, by the OECD, the International
19 Energy Agency (IEA) and Eurostat, (IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005).
- 20 • *the substitution method* which is used in slightly different variants by BP (2009) (Finley,
21 2009) and the US Energy Information Administration, each of which publish international
22 energy statistics, and
- 23 • *the direct equivalent method* that is used by UN Statistics (2010) and in multiple IPCC
24 reports that deal with long-term energy and emission scenarios (Nakicenovic & Swart,
25 2000); (Morita, et al., 2001); (Fisher, Nakicenovic, & al., 2007).

26 For non-combustible energy sources, the *physical energy content method* adopts the principle that
27 the primary energy form should be the first energy form used down-stream in the production
28 process for which multiple energy uses are practical (IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005). This leads to the
29 choice of the following *primary energy forms*:

- 30 • heat for nuclear, geothermal and solar thermal; and
- 31 • electricity for hydro, wind, tide/wave/ocean and solar PV.

32 The *direct equivalent method* counts one unit of secondary energy provided from non-combustible
33 sources as one unit of primary energy. This method is mostly used in the long-term scenarios
34 literature, including multiple IPCC reports ((Watson, Zinyowera, & Moss, 1996); (Nakicenovic &
35 Swart, 2000); (Morita, et al., 2001); (Fisher, et al., 2007)), because it deals with fundamental
36 transitions of energy systems that rely to a large extent on low-carbon, non-combustible energy
37 sources.

38 In this Special Report, IEA data are utilized, but energy supply is reported using the *direct*
39 *equivalent method*. The major difference between this and the *physical energy content method* will
40 appear in the amount of energy reported for electricity produced by geothermal heat, concentrating
41 solar thermal, ocean temperature gradients or nuclear energy.

42 Table 1.5 compares the amounts of primary energy by source and percentages using the *physical*
43 *energy content*, the *direct equivalent* and a variant of the *substitution method* for the year 2007
44 based on IEA data (IEA, 2009d).

1 **Table 1.5** Comparison of global total primary energy supply in 2007 using different primary energy
 2 accounting methods (data from IEA (2009a)).

	Physical content method		Direct equivalent method		Substitution method ³	
	EJ	%	EJ	%	EJ	%
Fossil fuels	411.09	81.62	411.09	85.27	411.09	79.41
Nuclear	29.69	5.90	9.81	2.04	25.79	4.98
Renewables	62.47	12.40	60.81	12.61	80.40	15.53
Bioenergy	48.31	9.59	48.31	10.02	48.31	9.33
Solar	0.40	0.08	0.40	0.08	0.49	0.10
Geothermal	2.05	0.41	0.39	0.08	0.78	0.15
Hydro	11.08	2.20	11.08	2.30	29.17	5.63
Ocean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Wind	0.62	0.12	0.62	0.13	1.64	0.32
Other	0.39	0.08	0.39	0.08	0.39	0.08
Total	503.64	100.00	482.10	100.00	517.67	100.00

3 IEA, 2009: Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries International Energy Agency, 2009 edition.
 4

5 For the purpose of this report, the direct equivalent method is chosen for the following reasons:

6 All non-combustible sources are treated in an identical way by using the amount of secondary
 7 energy they provide. This allows the comparison of all non-CO₂ emitting RE and nuclear energy
 8 sources on a common basis. Primary energy of fossil fuels and biomass combines both the
 9 secondary energy and the thermal energy losses from the conversion process. When fossil fuels or
 10 biofuels are replaced by nuclear systems or other renewable technologies, the total of reported
 11 primary energy decreases substantially (Jacobson, 2009). Energy and emissions scenario literature
 12 that deals with fundamental transitions of the energy system to avoid dangerous anthropogenic
 13 interference with the climate system over the long-term (50-100 years), has used the direct-
 14 equivalent method most frequently ((Nakicenovic & Swart, 2000); (Fisher, et al., 2007)).

15 Figure 1.7 shows the differences in the three methods when projected to 2050 for a particular
 16 scenario that might achieve a stabilization of CO₂ at 550ppm. A more complete discussion of
 17 the different methodologies is provided in Appendix II.

³ For the substitution method conversion efficiencies of 38% for electricity and 85% for heat from non-combustible sources were used. BP uses the value of 38% for electricity generated from hydro and nuclear. BP does not report solar, wind and geothermal in its statistics for which, here, also 0.38 is used for electricity and 85% for heat.




Figure 1.7 Comparison of global total primary energy supply between 2010 and 2100 using different primary energy accounting methods based on a 550 ppm CO₂-equivalent stabilization scenario ((Loulou, Labriet, & Kanudia, 2009)). See Chapter 10 and Appendix II for additional information.

1.3.2 Importance of energy end-use efficiency

Often the lowest cost option is to reduce end use energy demand through efficiency measures, which include new technologies and more efficient practices. For example, compact fluorescent or light emitting diode lamps use only about one-fourth to one-sixth as much electricity to produce a lumen of light as does a traditional incandescent lamp. Properly sized variable speed electric motors and improved efficiency compressors for refrigerators, air conditioners and heat pumps can lower primary energy use in many applications (Weizsäcker et al, 2009). Efficient houses and small commercial buildings such as the Passivhaus design from Germany are so air tight and well insulated that they require only about one-tenth the energy of more conventional dwellings ((Passivhaus, 2010). Avoiding international style glass box construction of high-rise buildings in tropical countries could dramatically reduce emissions at a substantial cost saving for cooling.

RE installations (with zero or low GHG emissions) are often more feasible once end use demand has been lowered. For example, if electricity demand is high, the size of the required rooftop solar system might be larger than the roof but, by lowering demand, the size and cost of the distributed solar system may be manageable.

The transportation sector could reduce emissions significantly by shifting to appropriately produced biofuels or by utilizing engineering improvements in traditional internal combustion engines to reduce fuel consumption rather than to enhance acceleration and performance. Biofuels become more feasible for aircraft as efficiency improves. Significant efficiency gains and substantial CO₂ emission reductions have also been achieved through the use of hybrid electric systems, battery electric systems and fuel cells (see sec. 8.3.1). Two additional approaches to energy efficiency are combined heat and power systems ((Casten, 2008)), and recovery of otherwise wasted thermal or mechanical energy (about 19% of US electricity equivalent with no increase in CO₂ emissions and at a few cents/kWh) ((Bailey & Worrell, 2005)). Combined heat and power can significantly reduce emissions by avoiding burning additional fuel for commercial and industrial heat. A residential scale unit that operates on natural gas is also available in Japan and North America.

These principles are also applicable to enhancing the overall delivery of energy from RE such as capturing and utilizing the heat from PV or biomass-electricity systems, which is done frequently in the forest products industry.


1 Technological improvements can and will continue to make progress reducing GHGs through
 2 efficiency. However, technology alone can only take us so far. The forecasted growth in population
 3 and the projected demand for energy could well outpace the pace of technological innovation, and
 4 emissions will continue to grow without some behavioural changes especially in the richer
 5 countries.

6 1.3.3 Current status of RE

7 1.3.3.1 Global primary energy consumption and electricity production

8 Since 1990, global energy consumption almost doubled, rising to around 504 EJ in 2007, with RE's
 9 share at approximately 13.0% (12.6%) ((IEA, 2009d)) See Figure 1.8.

10



11
 12 **Figure 1.8** Global primary energy consumption 2007 ((IEA, 2009b)).

13 The 12.6% RE is distributed as solid biomass (9.5%), large hydroelectric power (2.2%), geothermal
 14 (0.4%), liquid biomass (0.3%), and new renewables embracing wind solar and marine energy
 15 (0.2%). At the global level, on average, renewables have increased by 1.8% per annum between
 16 1990-2007 ((IEA, 2009d)) only just managing to keep pace with growth in total primary energy
 17 consumption (1.9%). Wind energy registered the highest average growth rate of 29.0%, and grid-
 18 tied solar PV 70 percent. The capacity of utility-scale solar PV plants 200 kilowatts) tripled during
 19 2008, to 3 GW. Solar hot water grew by 15 percent, and annual ethanol biodiesel production both
 20 grew by 34 percent. Heat and power from biomass and geothermal sources continued to grow, and
 21 small hydro increased by about 8 percent ((REN21, 2009a)).

22 Globally, around 55% of RE has been used to supply heat in private households and in the public
 23 and services sector. Essentially, this refers to wood and charcoal, widely used in developing
 24 countries for cooking. Electricity production stands at 24.0% ((IEA, 2009d)). RE's contribution to
 25 electricity generation is summarized in Table 1.6.

26

27 **Table 1.6.** RE share of world electricity production 2007


	Electricity TWh	Share of RE supply
Renewable total	3578	1
Biomass	259	0.073

Hydro	3078	0.860
Geothermal	62	0.017
Solar PV	4	0.001
Concetrating Solar Power	1	0.000
Wind	173	0.048
Tide & wave	1	0.000

1 Source: IEA WEO 2009 ((IEA, 2009d))

2 **1.3.3.2 Regional aspects of RE**

3 As regards biomass as a share of regional primary energy consumption. Africa is particularly high
 4 with a share of 47.0%, followed by India 20%, Asia excluding China 16%, and China 10% (Figure
 5 1.9)



6 **Figure 1.9** Biomass as a share of regional Primary Energy Consumption ((IEA, 2009d)).

7 UNEP finds that global investment in RE rose 5% and exceeded that for coal and natural gas by
 8 \$140 billion to \$110 billion in 2008 [TSU: needs to be converted into 2005US\$] despite a decline in
 9 overall energy investments. UNEP estimates that an additional \$15 billion [TSU: needs to be
 10 converted into 2005US\$] was invested in energy efficiency during that year. Much of this
 11 investment was in the United States, China and Europe ((UNEP, 2009); (REN21, 2009b)).

12
 13 In China, growing energy needs for solar cooking and hot water production have promoted their
 14 development. China is now the leading producer, user and exporter of solar thermal panels for hot
 15 water production, and has been rapidly expanding its production of solar PV, most of which is
 16 exported, and has recently become the leading global producer. In terms of capacity, in 2008, China
 17 was the largest investor in thermal water heating, second in wind power additions and third in
 18 bioethanol production. In terms of renewable power capacity, China now leads the world followed
 19 by the U.S., Germany, Spain and India ((REN21, 2009a)). China has been doubling its wind turbine
 20 installations every year for the past five years, and could overtake Germany and the U.S. by 2010.
 21 India has become a major producer of wind turbines and now is among the top five countries in
 22 terms of installation, and has become a major international turbine manufacturer.


23 These developments suggest the possibility that RE could play a much more prominent role in both
 24 developed and developing countries over the coming decades. New policies in the U. S., China and
 25 the EU are supporting this effort. European leaders signed up in March 2007 to a binding EU-wide
 26 target to source 20% of their energy needs from renewables, including biomass, hydro, wind and
 27 solar power, by 2020.

28 As noted above, RE is more evenly distributed than fossil fuels, there are countries or regions rich
 29 in specific RE resources. The share of geothermal energy in the national electricity production is

1 above 15% in four countries: El Salvador (22%), Kenya (19.8%), Philippines (19%) and Iceland
 2 (17%). More than 70% of energy is supplied by hydropower and geothermal energy in Iceland. In
 3 some years depending on level of precipitation, Norway produces more hydropower electricity than
 4 it needs and exports its surplus to the rest of Europe. New Zealand and Canada have also a high
 5 share of hydropower electricity to the total electricity: 65% and 60 %, respectively. Brazil is the
 6 second largest producer of bio-ethanol, which it produces from sugarcane.

7 **1.3.3.3 Global energy flows of primary RE**

8 Global energy flows from primary energy through carriers to end-uses and losses in 2004 are shown
 9 in Figure 4.4 of IPCC AR4 WG3. Figure 1.10, shown here, reflects primary RE only, utilizing the
 10 data for 2007 ((IEA, 2009d)). ‘RE’ here includes combustible biomass, forest and crop residues and
 11 municipal solid waste as well as the other types of RE considered in this report: wind, hydropower,
 12 geothermal energy and solar energy.



13 **Figure 1.10** Global energy flows (EJ in 2007) from primary RE through carriers to end-uses and
 14 losses (based on IEA data). ‘Other sectors’ include agriculture, commercial and residential
 15 buildings, public services and non-specified other sectors. ‘Transport sector’ includes international
 16 aviation and international marine bunkers. [TSU: Source?]


19 In 2007, renewable sources generated 18% of global electricity (19,756 TWh), which consisted of
 20 13% of primary energy (including traditional sources) and 18% of end use energy ((REN21, 2008);
 21 (REN21, 2009a)). The flow of biomass, which includes traditional uses, dominates this figure, but
 22 there is significant investment in modern RE technologies as noted above and accompanying rapid
 23 growth. Approximate technology shares of 2008 investment were wind power at 42%, solar PV 32
 24 %, biofuels 13%, biomass and geothermal power and heat 6%, solar hot water 6% and small
 25 hydropower at 5%). An additional \$40–45 billion [TSU: needs to be converted into 2005US\$] was
 26 invested in large hydropower ((REN21, 2009a)). Between 2003 and 2008, solar installations grew at
 27 an average annual rate of 56%, biofuels and wind at 25% and hydro by 4%. Germany in 2008
 28 produced 15% of its electricity and 10% of its total energy from renewable sources ((BMU, 2009)).

29 To integrate large fractions of RE into electric power systems requires improved transmission,
 30 distribution and storage technology and greater use of information technology in what is referred to
 31 as a smart grid as described in Chapter 8. Fully integrated energy planning for power production,

1 heating, cooling and transportation will require both management of supply and demand, improved
 2 end use efficiency and utilizing RE in ways that match its availability and appropriateness to
 3 specific tasks.

4 1.3.4 Current status of RE as function of development

5 1.3.4.1 Energy consumption and access to electricity



Total Primary Energy Supply/Population (GJ/Capita, 2007)

6
 7 **Figure 1.11.** Total primary energy supply per person in various countries: > 300 TJ/capita for U.S.
 8 and Canada, 100 - 200 TJ/capita for Japan, Korea, Germany, and other European countries, <50
 9 toe/capita most developing countries (adapted from (IEA, 2009b).

10 Access to electricity in developed countries is high and is still increasing but 1.4 billion people in
 11 developing countries still do not have access to electricity. The electrification rate is also different
 12 from region to region: North Africa 86%, China and East Asia 82.0%, and Latin America 60%,
 13 South Asia 32.0%, Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) less than 10% (IEA, 2004). Without more electricity
 14 supply, people cannot get energy services for activities such as electronics, lighting and productivity
 15 enhancing mechanical work such as sewing, carpentry and water pumping or purification. That said,
 16 in some developing countries ((E. Martinot, Chaurey, & al, 2002);(Johansson, McCormick-
 17 Brennan, & al., 2004) various kinds of RE have been introduced to meet the energy service
 18 demands as shown in 1.3.5.

19 1.3.4.2 Utilization of RE

20 Biomass is a major source of energy in developing countries. Table 1.7 indicates how inefficient the
 21 traditional biomass utilization in rural area is. Although consumption of commercial energy and
 22 electricity per capita in urban areas is more than double of that in rural areas (agricultural districts),
 23 the total energy consumption, including non-commercial energy, is much higher in rural areas.

1 Traditional biomass is typically used in inefficient devices, is often accompanied by health issues
 2 and is a major source of black carbon, which contributes to global warming. Finding improved
 3 energy sources in developing countries would improve health, enhance productivity and decrease
 4 climate change.

5 **Table 1.7.** Energy consumption of households in urban and rural areas of China. Non-commercial
 6 energy includes combustible RE such as methane, rice straw, and firewood. (ChinaStats, 2007)

	Energy consumption GJ/y per capita	Electricity consumption kWh/y per capita
Urban (commercial energy)	7.52	305
Rural (commercial energy)	3.57	149
Rural (non-commercial energy)	10.51	

7
 8 While blackouts are common in many cities in developing countries, they occur in developed
 9 countries as well. Urban centres have become totally reliant on electricity, and cannot function
 10 without it. Integration of very large amount of variable RE supply to the power grids raises some
 11 technical (systems) issues discussed in chapter 8.

12 Heat pump systems that extract stored solar energy from the air, ground or water have penetrated
 13 the market in developed countries sometimes in combination with renewable technologies such as
 14 PV and wind. Heat pump technology is discussed in chapter 4.

15 Sun-belt areas such as deserts and the Mediterranean littoral are abundant in clear sky solar energy
 16 and suitable for concentrated solar thermal power plants. The potential to export solar and wind
 17 energy from the countries rich in resources could become important in the future (Desertec, 2010);
 18 see case study in chapter 8).

19 1.3.5 Climbing the Energy Ladder


20 RE plays an important role in the movement from more traditional to more modern forms of energy
 21 supplied to consumers simply because it is typically available locally and can, with the right
 22 technologies, advance consumers up the energy ladder. RE based on off-grid energy systems can
 23 contribute to poverty alleviation and assist in achieving MDGs by providing unmet energy services,
 24 as indicated in section 1.1.5.

25 In developing countries, energy infrastructures are underdeveloped, but it's not clear that they
 26 should follow a western-style energy system with extensive and costly networks. More evenly
 27 distributed underdeveloped (and largely unmapped) RE sources are available in developing
 28 countries. Regions and communities without electricity and other modern sources of energy suffer
 29 from extreme poverty, limited freedom of opportunities, insufficient health care, etc. Although the
 30 energy system will be different from that of developed countries, to raise the electrification rate is
 31 indispensable for developing countries. About two thirds of the global hydropower potential is
 32 located in the developing countries. In favourable areas, wind energy has become cost competitive
 33 with conventional energies, the more so if external costs are taken into account. It has shown rapid
 34 development and cost reductions (see chapter 7) . Solar PV is likewise developing rapidly (see
 35 Chapter 3). The potential of these modern RE technologies in the developing countries is
 36 considerable.

37 Biomass is the dominant energy source in many developing countries and is increasingly being
 38 harvested in an environmentally unsustainable way. To avoid the inefficient traditional biomass
 39 utilization for cooking and heating, solar thermal energy utilization is practically useful as well as
 40 modern biofuel production. For example, as discussed in chapter 2, improved biomass stoves save
 41 10% to 50% of biomass consumption for the same cooking services and can dramatically improve

1 indoor air quality, as well as reduce black carbon and GHG emissions (Clancy, 2002). Solar water
 2 heating is an established technology that can be manufactured in developing countries (China is
 3 already the world's largest producer). Many developing countries in desert regions may be suitable
 4 locations for solar concentrating power technology (chapter 3).

5 Progress is being made in developing countries on improving the energy ladder from use of
 6 traditional biomass in the form of firewood, cow dung and agriculture residues to more
 7 environmentally benign devices/fuels including improved biomass stoves, biogas and, to some
 8 extent, solar cookers. Similar progress is being made for provision of modern energy services for
 9 productive use of heat and electricity. The energy ladder for household fuel transition is depicted in
 10 Figure 1.12.
 11



12 **Figure 1.12.** Energy Ladder: Household Fuel Transition.
 13 (Source: www.sparknet.info/goto.php/view/1/theme.htm) [TSU: Institution/website & year; link in
 14 footnote or reference list]
 15

16 With development, there is generally a transition up the 'energy-ladder' to fuels that are
 17 progressively more efficient, cleaner, convenient and expensive, such as natural gas, LPG and
 18 electricity. Commercial energy sources also permit the use of modern technologies that transform
 19 the entire production process at the factory level, in agriculture and within the home.

20 Electricity allows tasks previously performed by hand or animal power to be done much more
 21 quickly with electric powered machines. Electric lighting allows individuals to extend the length of
 22 time spent on production and hence on income producing activities. It also allows children time to
 23 read or do homework and access to television, computer and internet, which opens rural residents to
 24 new information that can instil the idea of change and the potential for self-improvement. Of
 25 interest in the energy ladder transition is the opportunity to use RE rather than diesel generators for
 26 either off or on-grid applications.

27 Commercial energy sources (in particular modern RE) permit the use of modern technologies that
 28 transform the entire production process at the factory level, in agriculture and within the home.
 29 Modern liquid fuels (including biofuels) permit modern modes of transportation that cut the cost,
 30 both monetary and in time, of travel to nearby towns for trade, education and healthcare. Table 1.8

1 summarizes the progress that has been made in introducing RE technologies in a number of
 2 developing countries that has greatly improved the delivery of energy services by moving up the
 3 energy ladder and the scale-up of off grid RE.

4 **Table 1.8.** Progress on Energy ladder and of grid RE application

Energy services/ technologies	Progress	Comments
Improved biomass cookstoves	I. 220 million improved biomass stoves now in use in the world	Increase due to a variety of public programmes over the last two decades. The number can be compared with almost 570 million households world wide that depend on traditional biomass as primary energy
	II. China with 180 million household representing 95% of such households	
	III. India with 34 million representing 25% of such households	
	IV. Africa has 8.0 million with Kenya having the largest number of 3.0 million	
Cooking and lighting	I. About 25 million households worldwide receive energy for lighting and cooking from household scale bio digesters	In addition to providing energy, biogas has improved livelihood of rural household-for example-reduced household time spent on firewood collection
	II. 20 million households in China	
	III. 3 million households in India	
	IV. 150,000 households in Nepal	
Small scale biomass gasification	I. Total capacity of gasifiers in India estimated up to 35MW	Gasifiers used for provision of electricity and heat for productive use e.g. textile and silk production, drying of rubber and bricks before firing
	II. More gasifiers have been demonstrated in the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri-Lanka and Thailand	
Village scale mini grids/ hybrid combinations	I. Tens of thousands of mini grids in China based on small hydro	Mainly from solar PV, wind and biomass, other in hybrid combinations
	II. Thousands in China, Nepal, Vietnam and Sri-Lanka	
	III. Use of wind and solar PV in mini grids and hybrid systems still in order of thousands in China	
Water pumping from wind and solar PV	I. About 1 million mechanical wind pumps in Argentina	Solar PV and wind power (both for irrigation and water pumping) gaining widespread acceptance
	II. Large numbers in Africa: South Africa (300,000), Namibia(30,000), Cape Verde(800), Zimbabwe(650)	
	III. 50,000 solar PV-pumps world wide. India (4000), West Africa (1000)	
	IV. The rest in Argentina, Brazil Indonesia, Namibia, Niger, Philippines, Zimbabwe	

5 *Source: REN21, 2008 and Ren21/GTZ/BMZ 2008 ((REN21, 2008)).*

6 1.3.6 Present status and future potential for RE

1.3.6.1 Meeting demands of developing countries through RE leapfrogging

Table 1.8 shows that technological options exist for providing cleaner cooking fuels and expanding rural electrification delivery –using mainly off-grid power generation. It is clear that successful technological leapfrogging examples are concentrated in Asia and in Brazil, the second largest consumer, and the major exporter of ethanol, which generates income within the country and improves energy security ((Brew-Hammond, Darkwah, & al., 2008)).

However, technological development cannot alone contribute to improved energy access in developing countries. Innovative policies, including financing, are required (see sec 1.4.6.2 and chapter 11).

1.3.6.2 Global Scenarios for RE deployment in the future

Chapter 10 includes a comprehensive analysis of over 100 scenarios of energy supply and demand to assess the costs and benefits of RE options to reduce GHG emissions and thereby mitigate climate change. Even without a push for climate change mitigation, the increasing demand for energy services is expected to drive growth of RE to levels exceeding today’s energy usage. There are large uncertainties in projections, including economic and population growth, development and deployment of higher efficiency technologies, the ability of RE technologies to overcome initial cost barriers, preferences, environmental considerations and other barriers.

1.4 Barriers, Opportunities and Issues

Almost everywhere in the world, one can find a RE resource of one kind or other – e.g., solar radiation, wind, falling water, waves, tides and stored ocean heat or heat from the earth - and there are technologies available to harness all of these forms of energy. The opportunities seem great. Then, why is RE not in universal use?

Firstly, there are *barriers*. A barrier was defined in the AR4 as ‘any obstacle to reaching a goal, adaptation or mitigation potential that can be overcome or attenuated by a policy programme or measure’ ((IPCC, 2007); (Verbruggen, et al., 2010)). For example, the technology as currently available may not suit the desired scale of application. This barrier can be attenuated in principle by a program of technology development (Research &Development).

Secondly, other *issues*, not so amenable to policies and programs, can also impede the uptake of RE. An obvious example is that the resource may be too small to be useful at a particular place: e.g., the wind speed may be consistently too low to turn a turbine or the topography too flat for hydropower.

This section describes some of the main barriers and issues to using RE for climate change mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. *As throughout this introductory chapter, the examples are illustrative and not comprehensive.* Section 1.5 (briefly) and Chapter 11 [section 11.4] of this report (in more detail) look at policies and financing mechanisms that may overcome them. When a barrier is particularly pertinent to a specific technology, it is examined in the appropriate ‘technology’ chapters of this report (i.e., chapters 2 to 7).

For convenience of exposition, the various barriers are categorised here as informational, socio-cultural, technical and structural, economic, or institutional (see Table 1.9). This categorization is somewhat arbitrary since, in many cases, barriers extend across several categories. More importantly, for a particular project or set of circumstances it will usually be difficult to single out one particular barrier. They are interrelated and need to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner.

More positively, RE can open opportunities for co-benefits, not least for adaptation to climate change. Some such opportunities are outlined in subsection 1.4.7.

1 **Table 1.9.** A categorisation of barriers to RE deployment

Subsection	Type of barrier	Some relevant policy instruments (see chapter 11)
1.4.1	Market failures	Carbon taxes, emission trading schemes, public support for R&D on RE)
1.4.2	Information and awareness barriers	Energy standards, information campaigns
1.4.3	Socio-cultural issues	Improved processes for land use planning
1.4.4	Technical and structural barriers	Enabling environment for innovation, revised technical regulations, international support for technology transfer (e.g. under UNFCCC)
1.4.5	Economic barriers	economic climate that supports investment, carbon taxes, emission trading schemes
1.4.6	Institutional barriers	Microfinance, technical training, liberalisation of energy industries

2 [TSU: Source?]

3 1.4.1 Market failures

4 Many, but not all, barriers are described by economists as *market failures*. With reference to the
 5 theoretical ideal market conditions ((Debreu, 1959), (Becker, 1971)), all real-life markets fail to
 6 some degree ((Bator, 1958);(Meade, 1971); (Williamson, 1985)), evidenced by losses in welfare.
 7 Three major market failures (imperfections) are undersupply of public goods, oversupply of
 8 negative externalities and rent appropriation by monopolistic entities. In case of RE deployment,
 9 they may appear as:

- 10 • Underinvestment in invention and innovation in RE technologies because initiators cannot
 11 benefit from exclusive property rights on their efforts ((Margolis & Kammen, 1999); (Foxon
 12 & Pearson, 2008)).
- 13 • Un-priced environmental impacts and risks of energy use when economic agents have no
 14 obligation to internalize the full costs of their actions ((Beck, 1995), (Baumol & Oates,
 15 1998)). GHG emissions and climate change are prevalent examples ((Stern, 2006);
 16 (Halsnaes, Shukla, & Garg, 2008), p.135; see also sec.1.4.5.1), but also impacts and risks of
 17 some RE projects and of other low-carbon technologies (nuclear, CCS) remain unpaid.
- 18 • The occurrence of monopoly or monopsony powers in energy markets limit competition
 19 among suppliers or demanders, free market entry and exit (see sec. 1.4.4.2). Monopoly and
 20 oligopoly power can be factual by deliberate concentration, control and collusion.
 21 Interconnected network industries (for example: electric, gas and heat transmission grids)
 22 within a given area, are natural monopolies because network services are least-cost when
 23 provided by a single operator ((Baumol, Panzar, & al., 1982)).

24 Characterizing these imperfections as market failures, with high likelihoods of significant welfare
 25 losses and of the impotence of market forces in clearing the imperfections, provides strong
 26 economic arguments for public policy intervention repairing the failures ((Coase, 1960); (Bromley,

1 1986)). On top of imperfections classified as market failures, various factors apart from market
2 prices and budgets affect the behaviour of market agents, and are categorised here as other types of
3 barriers.

4 1.4.2 Informational and awareness barriers

5 *1.4.2.1 Deficient data about natural resources*

6 RE is widely distributed (e.g. the sun shines everywhere) but is site-specific in a way that
7 'conventional' fossil-fuel systems are not. For example, the output of a wind turbine depends
8 strongly on the wind regime at that place, unlike the output of a diesel generator. While broad-scale
9 data on wind is reasonably well available from meteorological records, it takes little account of
10 local topography, which may mean that the output of a particular turbine could be 10-50 % higher
11 on top of a local hill than in the valley a few hundred metres away ((Petersen, Mortensen, Landberg,
12 H $\bar{}$ jstrup, & Frank, 1998)). To obtain such site-specific data requires on-site measurement for at
13 least a year and/or detailed modelling. Similar data deficiencies apply to many other RE resources,
14 but can be attenuated by specific programs to better measure those resources.

15 *1.4.2.2 Skilled human resources (capacity)*

16 To develop RE resources takes skills in mechanical, chemical and electrical engineering, business
17 management and social science, as with other energy sources. But the required skill set differs in
18 detail for different technologies and people require specific training. Developing the skills to
19 operate and maintain the RE "hardware" is exceedingly important for a successful RE project. It is
20 also important that the user of RE technology understand the specific operational aspects and
21 availability of the RE source. One case where this is important is in the rural areas of developing
22 countries (see Section 1.4.6.2). More generally, in some developing countries, the lack of an
23 ancillary industry of RE, (such as specialized consulting, engineering and procurement,
24 maintenance, etc) implies higher costs for project development and is an additional barrier to
25 deployment.

26 *1.4.2.3 Public and institutional awareness*

27 The oil price peaks of 1973, 1980, 1991 and 2008 made the consumer in both industrialised and
28 developing countries search for alternative sources of energy. These events brought broad
29 enthusiasm for RE, especially solar, wind and biomass, but detailed understanding remains more
30 limited about the technical and financial issues of implementation. For instance, opinion polls in
31 Australia (e.g., (ANU, 2008)) indicate strong public support for greater use of RE (and more
32 generally to mitigate climate change). On the technical aspects, many supporters of single
33 household PV energy systems are initially unaware that to be viable such systems require
34 appliances with much greater end-use efficiency than conventional ones. Even professionals often
35 lack awareness of RE possibilities, e.g. architects who specify 'conventional' heating systems
36 instead of renewable ones.

37 To be fully successful, a program to implement RE technologies requires that there be awareness
38 and support from not only the public, but the government, utilities and industries. Thus, stakeholder
39 consultation is necessary for successful implementation. However, in only a few countries have
40 there been a major effort to educate all parts of society about the nature of RE relative to traditional
41 fossil fuels.

42 1.4.3 Socio-cultural issues

1 *1.4.3.1 Social acceptance*

2 Social acceptance for RE is generally increasing; having domestic solar energy PV or domestic hot
3 water systems on one's roof has become a mark of the owner's environmental commitment (Bruce,
4 Watt, & Passey, 2009). By contrast, many wind farms have had to battle the 'not in my backyard'
5 (NIMBY) attitude before they could be established, as have nuclear power stations (Pasqualetti,
6 Gipe, & Righter, 2002); (Klick & Smith, 2010); (Webler & Tuler, 2010). See chapters 7 and 11 of
7 this report for more discussion of how such local planning issues impact the uptake of RE. Chapter
8 11 also includes a wider discussion of the enabling social and institutional environment required for
9 the transition to RE systems.

10 *1.4.3.2 Land use*

11 Farmers on whose land wind farms are built rarely object; in fact they usually see them as a
12 welcome extra source of income either as owners (Denmark) or as leasers of their land (U.S.), as
13 they can continue to carry on agricultural and grazing activities beneath the turbines ((Milborrow,
14 2001)) Other forms of RE preclude multiple uses of the land; e.g. a dam for hydropower. Land use
15 can be just as contentious in some developing countries. In Papua New Guinea, for example,
16 villagers may insist on being paid for the use of their land for (e.g.) a mini-hydro system of which
17 they are the sole beneficiaries. ((Johnston & Vos, 2005), p.66) Unintended consequences, such as
18 displacement of rain forests to grow crops for biofuels also need to be avoided.

19 *1.4.4 Technical and structural barriers*

20 *1.4.4.1 Resource issues*

21 RE draws on natural environmental flows of energy, most of which by their nature are variable and
22 almost always of lower intensity [W per m^2] than the petrol consumption of a motor car or the core
23 of a nuclear reactor (Twidell & Weir, 2006). These characteristics imply that the engineering
24 techniques needed to harness RE cost-effectively differ from those used for fossil or nuclear energy.
25 In particular, to manage energy supply systems for variable supply as well as variable demand
26 requires a systems approach, which will require the use of information technology. For example, to
27 use solar energy to heat a house in winter is best done by architectural design rather than by
28 converting it to electricity and then installing electric heaters around the building (See Chapter 3 of
29 this report).

30 *1.4.4.2 Existing infrastructure and energy market regulation*

31 The dispersed, relatively low energy-density, nature of most forms of RE implies that the most
32 effective utilization may be through distributed applications, rather than through large centralized
33 power systems such as are required by systems based on coal and nuclear energy. Unfortunately
34 much of the existing energy infrastructure is built on the centralized model. When a planned RE
35 application is of a centralized nature, such as the proposed solar concentrating power system in
36 North Africa intended to supply Europe, the energy source is not usually near existing supply
37 systems. This requires that transmission infrastructure has to be constructed, which adds to the
38 financial costs. This is not a new problem in that harnessing remote hydropower has been
39 accomplished and the electricity generated has been transported over very large distances.

40 Technical regulations and standards have evolved to make the current energy infrastructure fairly
41 safe and reliable. These standards and regulations generally assume that systems are of high power
42 density and/or high voltage and may therefore be unnecessarily restrictive for RE systems of low
43 power density. Most of the rules governing sea lanes and coastal areas were written long before

1 offshore wind power and ocean energy systems were being developed and do not consider the
2 possibility of multiple uses that include such systems (See Chapter 6 of this report).

3 The regulations governing energy businesses in many countries are still designed around monopoly
4 or near-monopoly providers (especially for electricity). These standards and regulations were
5 'liberalised' in several countries in the 1990s, to allow 'independent power producers' to operate,
6 although scales required often exclude many smaller proposed RE projects. There are current
7 regulations that protect the current centralized production, transmission and distribution system and
8 make the introduction of alternative technologies including many renewables difficult. An
9 examination and modification of existing laws and regulations is a first step in the introduction of
10 RE technologies especially into the electric power system (See chapters 8 and 11 of this report).

11 *1.4.4.3 Intellectual property issues*

12 Technological development of RE has been rapid in recent years, particularly in photovoltaics and
13 wind power. Patents protect many of these new developments. Concerns have been raised that this
14 may unduly restrict low-cost access to these new technologies by developing countries, as has
15 happened with many new pharmaceuticals ((Barton, 2007)).

16 *1.4.5 Economic barriers*

17 Chapter 10 of this report includes a detailed discussion of the current and projected costs of RE
18 systems. A few pertinent general features of the economics of RE are highlighted here.

19 *1.4.5.1 Cost issues*

20 Twidell & Weir (2006) point to some key questions that affect an assessment of the economic costs
21 and benefits of an energy system (Twidell & Weir, 2006):

22 (a) Whose financial costs and benefits are to be assessed: the owners, the end-users, or those of the
23 nation or the world as a whole? The costs of climate change to a nation or the world or even to a
24 local community have in the past been treated as external to the costs of an energy project, as seen
25 by its owners, operators and bankers. The averted costs of climate-related disasters were thus seen
26 as a benefit to the nation but not directly to the project proponents. However such 'external costs'
27 can be made internal to a project's finances by government policies, such as carbon taxes or
28 emission trading schemes, as discussed in Section 10.6 and Chapter 11 of this report.

29 (b) Which parameters or systems should be assessed: the primary energy sources or the end-use
30 services? The practical importance of this distinction was raised in section 1.3.1.

31 (c) Where does the assessment apply? The cost of RE at a particular site strongly depends on the
32 resource available. Similarly, adding a PV system near the end of a long power line from a central
33 power station can boost the voltage there much more cheaply than replacing the whole power line
34 by one with lower power losses. Its site-specific value to the grid operator is thus much greater than
35 its financial cost.

36 (d) When are the costs and benefits to be assessed: at the start of a project or levelized over its
37 working life? In marked contrast to fossil fuel systems, the fuel cost of RE systems is zero
38 (bioenergy excepted). Instead the main cost is the up-front capital cost.

39 This capital cost may be considerably higher than for a conventional energy system, but it is not
40 subject to the fluctuations of fossil energy prices - compare the oil price that has varied recently
41 from \$11 to 145 USD [TSU: needs to be converted into 2005US\$]0020per barrel. Such variation
42 makes it very difficult to assess, at the outset of a project, what will be its levelized cost of energy
43 production. In contrast, the capital cost, and hence the levelized cost, of an RE project is known at

1 the outset, or at worst is subject only to the relatively small variation in interest rates over the life of
2 the project. In either case the revenue stream is usually also uncertain (See Appendix II) (Gross,
3 Blyth, & Heptonstall); (Bazilian & Roques, 2008).

4 *1.4.5.2 Availability of capital and financial risk*

5 All power projects carry financial risk because of uncertainty in future electricity prices, regardless
6 of its source, making it difficult for a private or public investor to anticipate future financial returns
7 on investment. Moreover, the financial viability of an RE system strongly depends on the
8 availability of capital and its cost (interest rates) because the initial capital cost comprises most of
9 the economic cost of an RE system. While the predictability of such costs is a relative advantage of
10 RE systems, bankers are still often reluctant to lend for almost any purpose (e.g. in the financial
11 crisis of 2008-09) ((Wright, van der Heijden, Burt, Bradfield, & Cairns, 2008)).

12 An example of financial risk from an RE system outside the power sector is the development of
13 biofuels for aviation. In 2009 neither the potential bio-jet refiners nor the airlines fully understood
14 how to structure a transaction that is credit worthy and as a result might get financed if there were
15 financial institutions interested in these types of transactions ((Slade, Panoutsou, & Bauen, 2009)).

16 A socially important case where capital availability can be a barrier to modern energy services is in
17 the rural areas of developing countries (see section 1.4.6.2).

18 *1.4.5.3 Allocation of government financial support*

19 Since the 1940s, governments in industrialized countries have spent considerable amounts of public
20 money on energy-related research development and demonstration (RD&D). However, by far the
21 greatest proportion of this has been on nuclear energy systems. Usually, only in times of ‘energy
22 crisis’ has there been appreciable spending on RE technologies (IEA, 2008). See also section 10.5
23 of this report). However, following the financial crisis of 2008-09, some governments used part of
24 their ‘stimulus packages’ to encourage RE or energy efficiency. Tax write-offs for private spending
25 have been similarly biased towards non-RE sources (e.g., in favour of oil exploration or new coal-
26 burning systems), notwithstanding some recent tax incentives for RE (GAO, 2007). The policy
27 rationale for government support for developing new energy systems is discussed in section 1.5 and
28 chapter 11 of this report.

29 *1.4.5.4 Trade barriers*

30 There are tariff barriers (import levies) in some countries that render uneconomic some trade in
31 bioenergy that might otherwise be of mutual benefit (see chapter 2 of this report, sec. 2.4.7).

32 *1.4.6 Institutional barriers*

33 *1.4.6.1 Industry structure*

34 The energy industry in most countries is based on a small number of companies (sometimes only
35 one in a particular segment such as electricity or gas supply) operating a highly centralized
36 infrastructure. The institutional and personal skills and the mindset that this structure encourages
37 do not fit well with the model of multiple dispersed supplies that characterizes many forms of RE.
38 And even the more centralised forms of RE will usually entail transmission lines from new
39 locations. In this situation, changes to the laws and regulations governing energy supply may be
40 needed to allow RE concerns to operate at all, let alone to compete on a fair basis. Chapter 8 deals
41 with this and other ‘integration’ issues.

42 Energy businesses are among the largest in any country, industrialised or developing. They have
43 billions of dollars tied up in the existing infrastructure. Although some big businesses in Brazil and

1 Norway have already embraced RE, and others elsewhere are starting to do so, some incumbent
2 energy suppliers have lobbied against RE for decades. Hamilton (2007) graphically describes such
3 efforts in Australia (Hamilton, 2007). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development
4 presents the more positive view of some other large energy businesses (e.g., (WBCSD, 2008)).

5 *1.4.6.2 Technical and financial support (especially for scattered users)*

6 Technical support for dispersed RE, such as photovoltaic systems in the rural areas of developing
7 countries, requires many people with basic technical skill rather than a few with high technical skill
8 as tends to be the case with conventional energy systems. Training such people and ensuring that
9 they have ready access to spare parts requires new infrastructure to be set up.

10 Because the cost of such systems is largely up-front, it would be unaffordable to most potential
11 customers, especially in developing countries, unless a financial mechanism is established to allow
12 them to pay for the RE energy service month by month as they do for kerosene. Even if the initial
13 equipment is donated by an overseas agency, such a financial mechanism is still needed to pay for
14 the technical support, spare parts and eventual replacement of the system. The developing world is
15 filled with examples of systems abandoned for lack of such follow-through mechanisms. Failure to
16 have these institutional factors properly set up has been a major inhibitor to the use of RE in the
17 Pacific Islands, where small-scale PV systems would appear to be a natural fit to the scattered
18 tropical island communities (Johnston & Vos, 2005).

19 *1.4.7 Opportunities opened by RE, including for adaptation*

20 Section 1.1.4 has pointed out that the wider use of RE brings benefits not only for climate
21 mitigation but co-benefits in energy security, economic development that is both more sustainable
22 and more potentially more equitable than current patterns. In particular, RE with its dispersed
23 resource and scalable technologies can assist development in the rural areas of developing countries
24 and thereby lessen the urban drift of population with its attendant social problems ((Gupta, 2003);
25 (Cherni & Hill, 2009)). And in both developed and developing countries, some types of RE systems
26 create considerably more new jobs than do 'conventional' fossil-based or nuclear-based systems,
27 which tend to be much more centralised and mechanised (Wei, et al., 2010). Chapter 9 of this report
28 elaborates on many of these issues.

29 Since a degree of climate change is now inevitable, adaptation to climate change is an essential
30 component of sustainable development (IPCC-Synthesis, 2007). AR4 includes a chapter on the
31 linkage between climate mitigation (reducing emissions of GHGs) and climate adaptation (Klein, et
32 al., 2007). A co-benefit of some forms of RE which has not received much attention in the
33 literature, despite that chapter, is the potential to assist adaptation to climate change, as in the
34 following examples.

- 35 • Active and passive solar cooling of buildings [chapter 3] helps counter the direct impacts on
36 humans of rising mean temperatures.
- 37 • Dams (used for hydro-power) are also important in smoothing out the impacts of droughts
38 and floods, which are projected to be major impacts of climate change. Indeed, this is one of
39 reasons for building such dams in the first place [chapter 5; see also World Commission on
40 Dams ((WCD, 2000)).]
- 41 • Water pumps in rural areas, often powered by photovoltaics [chapter 3] or wind [chapter 7]
42 are also important tools for raising agricultural productivity, especially in dry seasons and
43 droughts.

- Tree planting and forest preservation along coasts and riverbanks is a key strategy for lessening the coastal erosion impacts of climate change. With suitable choice of species and silvicultural practice, these plantings can also yield a sustainable source of biomass for energy, e.g. by coppicing. [Chapter 2, section 2.5]

1.5 Role of policy, R&D, deployment, scaling up and implementation strategies

Policy sets the framework, the conditions and often the impetus under which publicly induced change can occur. If the advancement of RE in the context of climate change is seen as desirable or necessary, then actions will be required. Such actions cover every aspect of the progress of RE as a primary part of the energy system. The components of this advancement include development, testing, deployment, commercialization, market preparation, market penetration, maintenance, monitoring, etc. Chapter 11 reviews the various antecedents, policy developments, implementation and other conditions that allow for the appropriate policies to be put in to place.

The growth of RE systems in industrialised countries in the last decade or two has been greatest where it has been supported by policies such as feed-in tariffs, mandatory RE targets, or tax concessions for RE investment. But having such support switch on and off at short intervals, as the tax credits have done in the USA, results in bursts of quickly conceived projects followed by periods of inactivity as business are reluctant to invest because of uncertainty as to whether the support policy will continue. By contrast, the long-term certainty inherent in German feed-in-tariffs has propelled them into the lead in manufacturing RE technologies.

1.5.1 Policies for development of technologies

The debate surrounding technology development, its costs and its deployment is rich. The benefits and costs of R&D or of research, development and deployment (RD&D) involve discussions of two factor learning curves, where R&D expenditures are related to investment costs of technologies, mobilizing funds that includes coverage of deployment (RD&D) ((Sonntag-O'Brien & Usher, 2004)), the role of carbon pricing policies in technology development and more ((Bosetti, Carraro, & al., 2009)).

The question of who should cover the costs associated with the R&D for new technologies is complex. Should this be public funds or private, or some mixture of both? Ostensibly, commercial or economic benefits of the advancement in an existing technology or some more novel approach to capturing RE exist; these benefits should accrue to the investor. Historically, private enterprise has invested and consequently received the benefit while society has gained from advances made. Logically, one assumes that the bulk of the R&D should fall on the shoulders the firm / company / utility and it can be argued that public funds in R&D should be minimal or none. Others argue that the development and advancement of a new technology requires an initial impetus from foresighted planners and continued support to ensure commercialization in the future. Currently, the private sector is leading R&D of technologies that are close to market deployment, while public funding is essential for the longer term and basic research ((Fisher, et al., 2007), Section 3.4.2). Chapter 11.2.2 addresses these issues.

Market barriers exist that prevent the development and penetration of novel RE technologies into the energy system. Renewable supply companies are under sometimes significant disadvantages (risks) associated with the development of a new technology or service, especially when the market playing field is not level. For example, while many perceive RE to have qualities and values related to their cleanliness and renewability, the current market attributes no value as such to these characteristics. New technologies also face regulatory barriers that support existing systems, which by their nature discriminate against distributed energy sources such as rooftop solar PV or against wind and solar because of their variable nature.

1 Sufficient investment will be required to ensure that the best technologies are brought to market in a
2 timely manner. These investments, and the resulting deployment of new technologies, provide an
3 economic value and can act as ‘hedging’ strategies in addressing climate change. However, there
4 remains significant uncertainty, in part due to a paucity of data, that enables one to link ‘inputs’
5 (R&D and market stimulation costs) to ‘outputs’ (technology improvements and cost reductions)
6 ((Fisher, et al., 2007), Section 3.4.2). The role of the policy maker is important, whether to invest in
7 R&D, to ameliorate the risks faced by R&D products in the market or to develop the pilot and
8 demonstration projects so necessary for market acceptance.

9 1.5.2 Policies to move technologies to commercialization

10 The importance of policies to enhance technology development, described above, is crucial to the
11 advancement of RE supply there is also a need for policies to drive deployment. (Bosetti, *et al.*,
12 2009), in their gaming analysis using the WITCH model, argue that the establishment of enduring
13 and consistent carbon pricing policies are themselves sufficient to stimulate R&D and deployment
14 (without affecting R&D in other areas; i.e., it was not a diversion of funds) (Bosetti, et al., 2009)
15 Edmonds *et al.*, 2004) consider advanced technology development to be far more important as a
16 driver of emission reductions than carbon taxes (Edmonds, Clarke, Wise, Pitcher, & Smith, 2008).
17 Weyant (2004) concluded that GHG stabilization will require the large-scale development of new
18 energy technologies, and that costs would be reduced if many technologies are developed in parallel
19 and there is early adoption of policies to encourage technology development (Weyant, 2004). Both
20 statements speak to the need to ensure that newly developed technologies can move from the
21 pilot/development state to the production/commercialization state. Costs of piloting and ultimate
22 commercialization of a new technology/process can be very high and firms often find the greatest
23 expense and the greatest risk in this area. Many institutional support mechanisms were and are
24 available to move RE technologies into the market, e.g. grants, tax relief, feed-in tariffs and the like.
25 The failure of many worthy technologies to move from R&D to commercialization has been coined
26 the “valley of death” for new products (Markham, 2002); (Murphy & Edwards, 2003); Murphy, *et*
27 *al.*, 2003) .This is discussed in Ch. 11.5 Attempts to move renewable technology into mainstream
28 markets following the oil price shocks failed in most developed countries. Many of the technologies
29 were not sufficiently developed or had not reached cost competitiveness and, once the price of oil
30 came back down, interest in implementing these technologies faded. Solar hot water heaters were a
31 technology that was ready for the market and with tax incentives many such systems were installed.
32 But once the tax advantage was withdrawn, the market largely collapsed.

33 1.5.3 Implementation of policies (supply push vs. demand pull)

34 Policy and decision makers approach the market in a variety of ways: level the playing field in
35 terms of taxes and subsidies, create a regulatory environment for effective utilization of the
36 resource, internalize externalities of all options or modify or establish prices through taxes and
37 subsidies, create command and control regulations, provide government support for R&D, provide
38 for government procurement priorities or establish market oriented regulations, all of which shape
39 the markets for new technologies. Some of these, such as price, which modify relative consumers’
40 preference, provide a demand-pull and enhance utilization for a particular technology. Other such
41 as government supported R&D attempt to create new products through market push (Dixit &
42 Pindyck, 1994); (Freeman & Soete, 2000); (Moore, 2002) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Freeman and
43 Soete, 2000; Moore, 2002). Requirements that set either technology or performance standards
44 through regulation may also move in a direction that enhances the penetration of the product/service
45 in the market.

46 There is now considerable experience with several types of policies designed to increase the use of
47 renewable technology. Denmark became a world leader in the manufacture and deployment of

1 large-scale wind turbines by setting long-term contracts for renewably generated electricity
2 production. The Danes also made it relatively easy for farmer cooperatives to invest in wind
3 turbines and used their domestically produced machines in their foreign assistance program. The
4 Danish government left R&D to the private sector (Sawin, 2001). Germany has used a similar
5 market pull mechanism through its feed-in-tariff that assured producers of wind, solar and other
6 renewable sources of electricity that they would receive a higher rate for each kilowatt-hour of
7 renewably generated electricity for a long and certain time period. Germany is the world's leading
8 installer of solar PV, and until 2008 had the largest installed capacity of wind turbines (REN 21,
9 2009a). The U.S. has relied mostly on government R&D subsidies for RE technologies and this
10 supply push approach has been less successful. Early attempts by the state of California to
11 encourage wind power in the 1980s by an investment tax credit failed to produce an enduring wind
12 turbine environment. Some form of a production tax credit has resulted in much more production of
13 zero carbon electricity (Sawin, 2001).

14 The use of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) has been moderately successful in some states in
15 the U.S. China has encouraged renewable technology for water heating, solar PV and wind turbines
16 by investing in these technologies directly. China is already the leading producer of solar hot water
17 systems for both export and domestic use, and is now the largest producer of PV technology (REN
18 21, 2009a). After dropping its domestic incentives for PV technology, Japan fell behind as a major
19 producer of PV technology. It has proven very difficult to take away existing subsidies to other
20 technologies including fossil fuels and the construction of nuclear power plants in most countries.
21 Governments may resort to levelling the playing field by granting similar subsidies to RE
22 technologies.

23 1.5.4 Integrate policies into sectors

24 Since all forms of RE capture and production involve spatial considerations, policies need to
25 consider land use, employment, transportation, agricultural, water, food security, trade concerns and
26 other sector specific issues.


27 A major focus for RE is the electric power sector's need to introduce new technologies and to
28 rebuild the transmission and distribution grid. The grid must be more compatible with a system that
29 incorporates both large central power plants and a very distributed system of small renewable and
30 other suppliers. Such a system must harmonize conventional and biofuel plants that utilize the
31 otherwise lost heat associated with power production, rooftop solar PV, and mid-to-large scale
32 hydro, wind, concentrated thermal solar and geothermal power plants. Many current regulations and
33 laws support the structure and reliability of the current centralized grid locking in these
34 technologies, and prevent the wide-scale introduction of renewable electric generating technology.

35 For the transport sector, there are major questions of developing the infrastructure for either
36 biofuels, renewably generated hydrogen or battery and hybrid electric vehicles that are "fuelled" by
37 the electric grid or from off-grid renewable electrical production (Tomic & Kempton, 2007).

38 The agriculture sector presents unique opportunities for capturing methane from livestock
39 production and using manure and other crop wastes to provide on-farm fuels. There are now
40 examples of farms that utilize methane from livestock to heat buildings including greenhouses, run
41 electric generators and tractors. Brazil has been especially effective in establishing a rural
42 agricultural development program around sugar cane. Bioethanol produced from sugar cane in
43 Brazil is currently responsible for about 40% of the spark ignition travel and it has been
44 demonstrated for use in diesel buses and even in a crop duster aircraft. The bagasse, which is
45 otherwise wasted, is gasified and used to operate gas turbines for electricity production while the
46 "waste" heat is used in the sugar to bioethanol refining process (Pousa, 2007).

1.5.5 Policies to avoid negative externalities

Any change in energy systems will alter the status quo of presently used fuels and technologies. No development stands on its own and policy makers need to critique and incorporate into any assessment all aspects of the impacts of a policy designed to enhance renewable fuels. It is necessary to incorporate externalities of a switch to RE supply (land use, alternative values, aesthetic concerns, etc.) as well as review co-benefits associated with the development of that particular form of RE (e.g., reduction in air pollutants, GHG emissions reduction). Some producers of fossil fuels are concerned that any policies that encourage a move away from the use of fossil fuels will adversely affect their markets. Two analyses of implementation of oil reductions concluded that the major impact would be on unconventional oil sources that produce high CO₂ emissions from oil shales, oil tars and heavy bitumen much more than conventional supplies (Barnett, Dessai, & Webber, 2004); (Persson, Azar, Johansson, & Lindgren, 2007). It is also critical to consider the potential of RE to reduce emissions from a life cycle perspective, an issue that each of the following technology chapter addresses. While the use of biofuels can offset GHG emissions from fossil fuels, direct and indirect land use changes must be also be evaluated in order to determine net benefits.⁴ Such changes can include deforestation, conversion of grasslands to agricultural production, or diversion of agricultural production to fuel production. These may even result in increased GHG emissions, potentially overwhelming the gains from CO₂ absorption. An illustrative life cycle analyses, featuring expanded boundaries is shown in Figure 1.13.



21
22 **Figure 1.13.** Illustrative system for energy production and use illustrating the role of RE along with
23 other production options. A systemic approach is needed to conduct life cycle systems analysis.

24 1.5.6 Options are available if policies are aligned with goals

⁴ Note that such land use changes are not restricted to biomass based RE. For example, wind generation and hydro developments as well as surface mining for coal and storage of combustion ash also incur land use impacts.

1 An examination of alternative policies to encourage adoption of RE demonstrates that demand-pull
2 policies are generally more effective than supply-push policies (Sawin, 2004). A recent analysis of
3 alternative policies has found that wherever feed-in-tariffs are utilized to provide long-term
4 certainty for higher production prices to RE, it has been more effective than renewable portfolio
5 standards (Carpenter, 2009).

6 Germany, has proposed a goal of 100% RE by 2050 (BMU, 2009). According to David Wortmann,
7 Director of RE and Resources, Germany Trade and Invest has stated, "The technical capacity is
8 available for the country to switch over to green energy, so it is a question of political will and the
9 right regulatory framework. The costs are acceptable and they need to be seen against the huge
10 costs that will result if Germany fails to take action to cut its carbon emissions." (Burgermeister,
11 2009). Ultimately, we will need a basket of incentives to companies to develop the processing and
12 refining capacity, and positive fiscal and legal frameworks to advance the economic viability of RE.

13 1.5.7 Integration of RE supply into the existing energy system

14 Our current energy system is the consequence of a set of energy choices often made in the absence
15 of renewable supply (except for large hydro sources). As a result, institutional or operational
16 barriers may hinder or prevent the advent of RE into the system. There still exist utilities that
17 exhibit monopolies in all supply aspects – generation, transmission and distribution – and often
18 maintain conditions that retain out-of-date transmission regulations, favour traditional power
19 sources, do not recognize the benefits associated with new renewable supply sources and prevent
20 the transition of the energy system to a more sustainable form.

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